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THE SEPARATION OF HIGHER POWERS
Richard Albert*
ABSTRACT
The very first words of the very first amendment to the United States
Constitution continue to frustrate the quest for constitutional clarity. The
Bill of Rights' Establishment Clause commands in plain terms that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," but the
legal interpretation and political implications of the Clause remain con-
tested today as ever before. What may government require of religion?
What may religion demand of government? How much of its indepen-
dence must religion cede to government? And how closely may govern-
ment collaborate with religion? These enduring questions admit of no
definitive answers, at least not without an organizing logic that can bring
coherence and purpose to the Establishment Clause. In this Article, I sug-
gest that the concept of the separation of powers can help do just that. Us-
ing separation of powers theory, I construct a framework for clarifying the
meaning of the Establishment Clause, giving political actors guidance for
crafting policy pursuant to it, and making predictable its interpretation in
courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HE very first words of the very first amendment to the United
States Constitution continue to frustrate the quest for constitu-
tional clarity. The Establishment Clause commands in plain terms
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion,"1 but its legal interpretation and political implications remain unclear
today as ever before.2 What may government require of religion? What
may religion demand of government? How much of its independence
must religion cede to government? And how closely may government
collaborate with religion? These enduring questions admit of no defini-
tive answers, at least not without an organizing logic that can bring coher-
ence and purpose to the Establishment Clause.
Separation of powers theory can help. Few scholars have ever ob-
served the connection between the separation of powers and the separa-
tion of Church and State-and the few who have observed the
connection have gone no further than that.3 Yet the separation of powers
offers a useful framework for clarifying the meaning of the Establishment
Clause, giving political actors guidance for crafting policy pursuant to it,
and making predictable its interpretation in courts. The three democratic
values we aspire to achieve by separating the branches of the national
government-personal liberty, institutional equality, and departmental
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006);
Mark S. Kende, Free Exercise of Religion: A Pragmatic and Comparative Perspective, 55
S.D. L. REV. 412, 415-16 (2010); Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a
Higher Law Resolve the Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY'S L.J. 41, 108 (2009);
Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1241
(2010).
3. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 94 (1980); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint:
Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445, 468 (2002); Carl H. Esbeck, The Estab-
lishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10
n.35 (1998); Patrick M. Garry, The Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause: A Refu-
tation of the Argument that the Clause Serves to Protect Religious or Nonreligious Minori-
ties, 59 MERCER L. REV. 595, 596-97 (2008); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance
Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 470 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establish-
ment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 808 (1999); Timothy K. Kuhner, The
Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2355-56 (2007); Feisal Abdul
Rauf, What Is Islamic Law?, 57 MERCER L. REV. 595, 614 (2006).
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independence-resonate just as intensely when applied to the relation-
ship between God and man, our two masters. These two higher powers
compel our conduct and command our conscience, not unlike the way the
public institutions to which the Constitution assigns functions constrain
our comportment.
The most useful way to understand how separation of powers theory
can help clarify the relationship between Church and State is to begin by
visualizing it. Picture a block of clay that consists of X units.4 That block
of clay represents all conceivable powers that may be exercised in a given
jurisdiction. Consider first the national separation of powers, pursuant to
which the United States Congress exercises its constitutionally delegated
powers, the President exercises his or her executive authority, and the
federal courts exercise their judicial functions. The block of national
powers would be divided into three parts such that the X units of exercis-
able powers would be allocated among the three branches of the national
government. In the context of the separation of Church and State, the
separation of higher powers-between religion and government-would
begin from the same point of departure of X units of exercisable powers.
But instead of conceiving of the separation of powers as among four enti-
ties-the three national branches plus religion-the separation of higher
powers invites us to understand the universe of power-exercising entities
as a duality: government on the one hand and religion on the other. We
may therefore picture our block of clay divided into two parts: one part
consisting of the powers exercisable by religion and the other part con-
sisting of the powers exercisable by government, for instance the national
government. Under this scenario, the national government would see its
allocation of exercisable powers further divided into three parts among
the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.
Speaking in the same breath of religion and the separation of powers
may admittedly strike a dissonant chord. After all, how can we translate
the logic of a rigid constitutional structure into the vocabulary of a sacred
belief that often defies delimitation? The discomfort this incommensura-
bility arouses is the very reason the separation of powers is the best vehi-
cle to referee contests about the variable permeability and impregnability
of the constitutional perimeter surrounding our higher powers. The sepa-
ration of powers presupposes among the separated powers reciprocal re-
spect, mutual benefit, and the freedom to act with plenary power within
their respective spheres of authority. Whether we wish to protect the in-
tegrity of religion, the state, or both, the high ambitions of preserving the
secular character of the state and respecting the sacrality of religion de-
mand deference only the separation of powers can afford.
For over two centuries, the Supreme Court of the United States has
been called to mediate competing claims of authority pitting Church
against State. In fixing the constitutional balance of power between
4. I am grateful to Chad Flanders for this useful analogy, and to Jessie Hill for help-
ing to develop it.
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them, the Court has created and recreated a number of constitutional
tests to demarcate the boundary separating God from man. Those tests-
the neutrality principle, the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the
coercion test-have emerged from noble efforts to construct an analytical
framework to bring constitutional clarity to the Establishment Clause.5
But what has gone unnoticed is that the separation of powers is the com-
mon thread that runs through each of these tests. The consequence of
missing the forest for the trees has been to probe narrowly the elements
of a particular test instead of, more advisedly, to reflect broadly on the
larger political purpose and institutional profit of the Establishment
Clause.
Yet the separation of powers entails as much peril as it does promise
for the future of the Establishment Clause. Without an operational
blueprint or guiding vision for how to apply the separation of powers to
the separation of Church and State, the Establishment Clause risks re-
maining enveloped in its current haze. That is why the battleground in
applying separation theory to the Establishment Clause will require the
Court to choose between the two ways in which the separation of powers
manifests itself in the Constitution: vertically or horizontally. The hori-
zontal separation of powers refers to the tripartite division of authority
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the same level
of government. As coordinate departments possessing constitutionally
allocated powers, the three national branches of government are equal
partners in the project of governing under the Constitution. In contrast,
the vertical separation of powers refers to the federal arrangement be-
tween the national and state governments. What follows from the verti-
cally divided powers of federalism is first, that the national institutions
stand above their state counterparts in the hierarchy of constitutional au-
thority, and second, that states are subject to the intrusive reach of the
national government when deemed necessary to the national interest.
Consistent with this second implication, national nullification of state
laws or practices is authorized by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.6
Whether the Court adopts a vertical or horizontal theory of separated
powers depends on whether the Court understands God and man as oc-
cupying competing or complimentary spheres of influence. Were the
Court to conceive of Church and State as vertically separated powers,
one would necessarily stand above the other as is the case in the federal
hierarchy of governmental powers. Alternatively, were the Court to see
Church and State as horizontally separated powers, each would be enti-
tled to the powers and immunities of an equal partner in the venture of
American nationhood. There is a third possibility: the Court could
choose an amalgam of horizontal and vertical separation, casting Church
or State in the role of primus inter pares, or first among equals. Each of
these three renderings of separation theory could have significant rever-
5. See infra Part III.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI; La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986).
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berations on the course of the Establishment Clause. Therefore, al-
though separation theory could bring much needed clarity to the
Establishment Clause, that clarity would not come without consequences,
which is why the Court must both choose carefully between vertical and
horizontal separation and remain consistent in applying that choice.
This Article serves both as an invitation and a warning. It is, first, an
invitation to the Court to rely on the separation of powers as its concep-
tual framework for interpreting the Establishment Clause. Though the
separation of powers analogy does not map perfectly onto the separation
of Church and State, the differences do not undermine the larger theory
of separation that could fruitfully inform the task of constitutional inter-
pretation. I offer the Court a tripartite taxonomy of separated higher
powers that can serve as the backdrop for situating and interrogating the
relationship between religion and government: Church and State, Church
over State, and Church under State. Second, this Article should also raise
a flag to the Court. Despite the strident calls for the Court to clarify its
establishment case law, it is not entirely certain that clarity would serve
the interests of either the Court or the nation. The consequences-both
beneficial and problematic-of constitutional clarity will become clear in
the pages to follow.
The task I have given myself is to bring to bear the insights of separa-
tion theory to the Establishment Clause. Insofar as my ambition is to
provide useful guidance to the Court, I will for the most part mirror the
Court's formalist, rather than functional, approach to the separation of
powers. 7 I will begin, in Part II, by examining the founding wisdom of
separated powers with special attention to the democratic values they
serve. In Part III, I will show that each of the Court's Establishment
Clause tests is animated above all by the very same democratic values we
seek to vindicate with the separation of powers. This Part will moreover
detail the deep interconnections between the separation of powers and
the separation of Church and State. Part IV will illustrate the stakes in
applying either a vertical or horizontal theory of separation of powers to
the Establishment Clause. Part V will conclude that the separation of
powers does indeed hold promise for finally bringing purpose and coher-
ence to the Court's religion jurisprudence. Only with a consistent appli-
cation of either vertically or horizontally separated powers may we at last
find peace in the constitutional law of religion and government.
II. THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF SEPARATED POWERS
The separation of powers is the cornerstone of the American constitu-
tional edifice. No principle is more constitutive of American constitu-
tionalism. Yet the separation of powers is nowhere expressly referenced
7. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (illustrating the Court's formal-
ist approach to the separation of powers); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers
and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608-11 (2001) (distin-
guishing between formalism and functionalism in separation of powers theory).
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in the text of the United States Constitution. The separation of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers must instead be inferred from the
structure of the Constitution, which simultaneously creates each of the
three departments and confers upon them powers that appear across dif-
ferent parts of the Constitution. 8 The separation of powers therefore in-
heres in the very architecture of the text itself,9 delegating the powers and
rooting the prerogatives of the political actors created by the Constitu-
tion.10 This constitutional design was not happenstance. The revolution-
ary statesmen who gathered in Philadelphia to write America's
Constitution drew their inspiration from the man they called the great
"oracle who is always consulted and cited,"'" Montesquieu, a leading
French philosopher whose work counseled making separated powers the
organizing logic of liberal democracy.1 2 The founding framers therefore
set the separation of powers as the blueprint for the new Republic.
A. WHY SEPARATE?
Separating powers was a wise choice. Constitutional designers have
long believed that liberty demands separated powers. Ancient Greek and
Roman philosophy originally adopted the theory of "mixed government"
to accommodate the dissimilar interests of stratified social classes. 13 This
was a personified separation of powers. But that later gave way to the
more complicated and democratic model of separation that governs to-
day: the personified and functional separation of powers. As early as the
Magna Carta, constitutional drafters divided authority over multiple loci,
believing both that the bodies exercising official power would enjoy
greater freedom to act within their respective spheres of jurisdiction and
that those individuals and groups subject to the exercise of official power
would lead freer, more enjoyable, and more predictable lives. That was
the result of granting to the English Church certain rights and privileges
and delegating others to the King.14 The same was true of the eight-
eenth-century French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,
which proclaims that the separation of powers is so indispensable to de-
8. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. (creating, and vesting powers in, the Legislature, Execu-
tive and Judiciary, respectively).
9. Akhil Amar has coined the evocative term architexture to refer to the structural
and textual continuities of the constitutional text. See Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77
IND. L.J. 671, 672 (2002).
10. The Constitution is therefore an illustration of impliedly separated powers. In this
respect, the Constitution is quite unlike the constitutions of other western liberal democra-
cies whose constitutional texts state in plain terms that governmental powers shall remain
separated. See, e.g., CONSTITUIcAo FEDERAL tit. IV, § VIII, art. 60, para. 4.111 (Braz.);
PERUSTUSLAKI ch. 1, § 3 (Fin.); CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI pmbl. (Turk.).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
12. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, Ch.
6, at 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989).
13. Gavin Drewry, The Executive: Towards Accountable Government and Effective
Governance?, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 280, 282 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver
eds., 5th ed. 2004).
14. Magna Carta cl. 1 (1215).
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mocracy that no constitution can exist without it.15 Today, the constitu-
tional commitment to the separation of powers remains firmly
entrenched in the political soul of liberal democracies, so much so that
scholars maintain, correctly in my view, that democracy demands sepa-
rated powers. 16 But this chorus of scholarly agreement tells us nothing
about why separating powers matters.
Constitutions separate powers in the service of democracy and the val-
ues that we deem minimally constitutive of democracy. The separation of
powers is the engine that allows the body politic to uphold its twin com-
mitments to liberty and good government. 17 The U.S. Constitution's
principal interest is not efficiency; this is obvious from the intricate sys-
tem of interlocking checks and balances that frustrate institutional con-
solidation and slow the process of legal and constitutional change. 18 Its
principal interest is instead the entrenchment of liberty. It achieves this
high ambition in many ways, but no way is more important than one: the
separation of powers. Separating official power prevents the concentra-
tion of power and the tyrannical abuse of authority that the accrual of
power makes possible.19 It also tames the state and frees individuals
from the fear of autocracy. But the simple act of dividing power among
multiple sites of authority does not on its own foster liberty. There are
two prerequisites to achieving that liberty: first, the sites of authority
must be mutually respectful and equal, and second, they must also stand
independently and apart from the others. Those, then, are the demo-
cratic values that the separation of powers manages to serve so well.
Consider the first of three reasons generally invoked for separating
powers: to preserve and promote the rule of law is perhaps the overriding
purpose of separating powers.20 The rule of law is the very basis of con-
stitutional democracy. The rule of law rests on predictability in the ad-
ministration of the law, employing reason instead of emotion in the
application of the law, and insisting on accountability of the officeholders
15. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen art. 16 (1789).
16. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Human Rights in Israel, 39 ISR. L. REV. 12, 20 (2006);
Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is
Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 54-55
(2001); Reynaud N. Daniels & Jason Brickhill, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and the
South African Constitutional Court, 25 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 371, 378 (2006); Ruth
Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 529 (1999); Patrick Heller,
Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India, 52 WORLD POL. 484, 492
(2000); Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial
Review Vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415, 421 (2000).
17. JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 14 (1996).
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
19. ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1998).
20. HAROLD H. BRuFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE STATE 4-5 (2006).
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to whom citizens entrust the responsibilities of government. 21 A constitu-
tional separation of powers furthers each of those virtues. When public
institutions possess itemized responsibilities, individuals can better hold
those institutions accountable for the actions they take and the ones they
do not. This leads us to the connection between the rule of law and pre-
dictability in the law:
In its origin, the rule of law derives from the claim by all political
rulers, good or bad, liberal or authoritarian, to a monopoly or near
monopoly of the use of force. This imposes on them all, irrespective
of their class, not just the moral duty, but the practical necessity to
police stability by imposing norms of conduct not only reflected in a
criminal code, but extending to the settlement of all civil disputes
between individuals who might otherwise be tempted to take the law
into their own hands. This means the establishment of ordered gov-
ernment operating under a set of intelligible rules leading to predict-
able results.22
We can therefore conceive of the constitutional allocation of powers as
a checklist against which to judge the performance of each of the
branches. Not only may we assess whether task X was discharged by
branch A as required by the constitutional text, but we may also evaluate
how well that branch performed its task. We may, moreover, discern
whether branch A has mistakenly performed a task that was otherwise
assigned to branch B or C, in which case we could likewise hold branch A
accountable for the misdeed of overstepping its constitutional bounda-
ries. In a constitutional culture of separated powers, arbitrary exercises
of power become less likely.23 The separation of powers therefore re-
strains official power by imposing rules for its exercise, both as to whom
may exercise it and how.24
The real value of a regime anchored in the rule of law is the liberty that
follows from it. Personal liberty is derivative of the rule of law and only
risks compromise to public institutions in the absence of constitutionally
bounded directives. The separation of powers is essential in this respect
because it fosters the rule of law, which itself ensures liberty.25 How? As
constitutional theorist Trevor Allan explains, the rule of law "assumes a
division of governmental powers or functions that inhibits the exercise of
arbitrary state power, ' '26 and in turn "[t]he division of power ensures that
21. See generally, Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the
Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15
CARiOzo L. REV. 137 (1993) (describing the purposes and implications of the separation
of powers applied to constitutional interpretation).
22. LORD HAILSHAM, ON THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1992).
23. Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Pow-
ers, Rights and Representative Democracy, 44 POL. STUD. 436, 438 (1996).
24. ROGER MASTERMAN, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY CON-
STITUTION 13 (2011).
25. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 14 (Liberty
Fund, Inc. 2d ed. 1998) (1967).
26. T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF
LAW 31 (2001).
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public officials cannot create new rules and enforce them at the same
time, making people subject to their will as it evolves from case to
case." 27 Imagine the abuses of power that would ensue where one person
or body was given the power to write, interpret, and enforce its own laws:
"there would be no force, other than good will, to counteract the tempta-
tion to use the powers of government to provide exemptions from the
operation of the law and establish special privileges and immunities for
the ruling class or governing faction."'2 8 But dividing power makes possi-
ble the popular control and accountability of the government.
2 9
A related democratic value that flows from separating powers is inter-
branch comity. 30 To understand this point, we may draw an analogy to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 31 which requires each state to recognize
the constitutional actions and judgments of another. When the State of
Delaware grants a charter to a new corporation, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts must recognize that corporation's constitutional rights and
legal privileges within its own borders. 32 Similarly, interbranch comity
invites the Legislature, for example, to cede to the Executive's choice on
a matter that falls within its uncontested jurisdiction. We would likewise
expect the Judiciary to defer to the Legislature or the Executive in mat-
ters best left to their own judgment. Indeed, interbranch comity is the
very basis for the political question doctrine, pursuant to which federal
courts commonly decline to decide a constitutional dispute because the
duty of resolution rests with "a coordinate political department.
33
What interbranch comity really illustrates is mutual respect and institu-
tional equality. When a state takes an action that it anticipates will be
recognized in its sister states, the expectation is anchored in the mutual
respect that states grant to each other. It flows from the reciprocal defer-
ence that one state shows another by virtue of their joint venture as mem-
bers in the constitutional compact. The same institutional posture attends
to the relationship among separated branches of government. The Legis-
lature, Executive, and Judiciary are free to conduct their own affairs in
their respective zones of exclusive authority without disruption from
other branches.34 True, each branch retains the power to check the ex-
cesses of the others, but those constitutional tugs-of-war occur at the
outer limits of constitutional delegations of power. When the branches
act squarely within their bounded authority, they have plenary power.
27. Id. at 48.
28. JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 328 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 3d ed.
2000) (1989).
29. PAUL STARR, FREEDOM'S POWER: THE TRUE FORCE OF LIBERALISM 58-59
(2007).
30. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997).
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
32. See id.
33. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
34. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLA-
TORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMIrY 7, 14 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
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They exercise their own peculiar functions, not completely independently
of the others,35 but with autonomy and a presumption of constitutional
correctness. In this sense, the separated branches enjoy reciprocal equal-
ity in the exercise of their constitutional authority. No institution pos-
sesses primacy over the others; there is instead a "balanced strength" that
characterizes the collective structure of the three branches. 36 It is a "har-
monious balance" in which the "the interests of each of the tripartite ele-
ments [are] addressed and protected. '37 The Judiciary is preeminent in
its sphere, just as the Legislature and the Executive are preeminent in
their own. Only by respecting the constitutionally bounded spaces re-
served for each branch may the branches carry on their delegated tasks
and in turn give their constituents the good government the Constitution
is designed to foster.
But neither personal liberty nor institutional respect and equality is
possible in the absence of departmental independence within a larger
framework of departmental interdependence. That is the third demo-
cratic value the separation of powers helps constitutional states achieve.
The U.S. Constitution's separation of powers protects the independence
of each branch in specific ways. For instance, the Executive is shielded
from legislative interference insofar as legislators cannot concurrently
hold an executive appointment.38 Additional protections for the Execu-
tive include the President's election by electors, not by Congress;39 the
President's plenary power over diplomacy and the recognition of diplo-
matic engagements;40 and the President's power of removal without Sen-
ate ratification.41 Likewise, Congress cannot pass a bill of attainder in
large part because that would invade the province of the Judiciary.42
Other judicial protections include the prohibition preventing Congress
from altering the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, 43 or, more gener-
ally, from abolishing the Supreme Court" or the position of Chief Jus-
tice.45 As for the Congress, its independence is served well by a number
of protections: the President may not dissolve the Congress;46 each cham-
ber may judge the selection and qualifications for membership; 47 its
members cannot be arrested while Congress is in session;48 and no one
35. CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT
247-48 (1930).
36. See CHARLES 0. JONES, SEPARATE BUT EQUAL BRANCHES: CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENCY 10 (2d. ed. 1999).
37. MICHAEL FOLEY, THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 14 (1999).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
39. Id. art. II, § 1.
40. Id. art. II, § 3.
41. Id. art. II, § 2.
42. See id. art. I, § 9.
43. Id. art. III, § 2.
44. Id. art. III, § 1.
45. Id. art. I, § 3.
46. Id. art. I, § 4.
47. Id. art. I, § 5.
48. Id. art. I, § 6.
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but its own members may gainsay its internal operating rules.49 Nor may
executive or judicial officers interfere with congressional speeches and
debates.50 A further illustration of the independence that one branch en-
joys from the other is the constitutional prohibition against diminution of
presidential5' and judicial salaries.52 All of these and other examples
demonstrate the Constitution's attentiveness to departmental indepen-
dence in a regime of separated powers.
Return for a moment to our discussion of interbranch comity. In a
regime of separated powers, the branches of government enjoy a recipro-
cal respect and equality of status insofar as they may fulfill their functions
secure in the knowledge that one branch will recognize the legality of
actions taken in the heart of the other's constitutional jurisdictions. What
happens when there is a conflict about which branch is responsible for
which function? The theory of separated powers points to the checks and
balances in the separated system as the answer. Each branch operates
independently of the other, possessed of the power of oversight and lim-
ited control to challenge the disputed institutional prerogatives of a coor-
dinate branch.53 Power checks power and institutional prerogative
collides with institutional prerogative, all in the service of preventing the
accumulation of power in the hands of a single branch. The separation of
powers fortifies the independence of the branches by conferring upon
each a toolkit of obstructive devices to slow the quickening pace of con-
centrating power in another.54
Separation of powers theory therefore requires the independence of
the branches.55 Equipped with independent judgment, each branch may
carry out its duties under the constitutional text but may, moreover, take
action to curb other branches' institutional overextensions that threaten
to destabilize the balance of power among the three coequal branches.
Self-policing and mutual oversight is a corollary of separated powers:
"An institution cannot check unless it has some measure of indepen-
dence; it cannot retain independence without the power to check."'56 In
this way, the separation of powers divides responsibilities even as it blurs
them; the constitutional allocation of power creates many different fora
49. Id. art. I, § 5.
50. Id. art. I, § 6.
51. Id. art. II, § 1.
52. Id. art. II, § 1.
53. Barbara B. Knight, Introduction to SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 1, 14-15 (Barbara B. Knight ed., 1989).
54. Harvey C. Mansfield, Separation of Powers in the American Constitution, in SEPA-
RATION OF POWERS AND GooD GOVERNMENT 3, 10 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W.
Schramm eds., 1994).
55. See J.W.F. ALLISON, THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION: CONTINUITY,
CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EimcmS 76-77 (2007).
56. Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
6 (4th ed. 1998).
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within which branches actually "share and compete" 57 for authority when
the contested function falls nowhere within the categorical purview of
any branch. Although one branch may achieve ascendancy over another,
it is typically only a temporary imbalance in the constitutional hierarchy
because the design of the Constitution is predisposed to returning the
branches to an institutional equilibrium. 58 In the event of an interbranch
tussle about constitutional correctness, the constitutional separation of
powers can therefore serve as a referent for a dispute pitting one branch
versus another.59
B. SEPARATION AT THE FOUNDING
Quite apart from the constitutional theory of separated powers, the
constitutional politics of separated powers likewise point to the same
democratic values of liberty, equality, and independence. No wonder,
then, that the framers of the U.S. Constitution saw great virtue in the
separation of powers. For them, separated powers would form the foun-
dation of the American constitutional order and would create the basic
framework that would spur the development and subsequent entrench-
ment of the first principles of democratic government, namely democratic
legitimacy, legitimate authority, and the rule of law. The separation of
powers was the roadmap that would lead to their desired destination; it
was the means toward an end: "[Separated powers] are means, and pow-
erful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided."' 60 The framers there-
fore chose to separate powers not for the sake of separation itself, but
rather to make possible the democratic values that they correctly deemed
necessary for good government.61
For the framers, good government sprang from three democratic val-
ues: institutional equality, departmental independence, and personal lib-
erty. They understood the separation of powers as vital to achieving
these three values. First, by dividing public authority equally among
three departments, the separation of powers would prevent the concen-
tration of power and consequently frustrate the rise of tyranny. Second,
the separation of powers grants to each branch a sphere of independent
57. Jeb Barnes, Adversarial Legalism, the Rise of Judicial Policymaking, and the Sepa-
ration-of-Powers Doctrine, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTER3RANCH PERSPEC-
TIVE 35, 48 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).
58. JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND POLICYMAKING: A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 5 (1994).
59. John M. Rogers, Anticipating Hong Kong's Constitution from a U.S. Legal Per-
spective, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 451 (1997).
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, supra note 11, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
61. Even the anti-federalist opponents of the Constitution supported this proposition,
perhaps even more adamantly than the Federalists. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec. 18,
1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DE-
BATES 237, 240 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986); Brutus, Essay XVI (Apr. 10, 1788), in THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra, at
331, 335.
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jurisdiction over which they hold dominion and enjoy a rebuttable pre-
sumption of constitutional correctness; this point derives from regarding
each branch as institutionally equal. Third, the separation of powers is a
guarantor of liberty insofar as its assignment of discrete functions to the
three branches serves to circumscribe the authority each can legitimately
exercise. Those, then, were what the framers perceived as the three vir-
tues of the separation of powers. In a regime of separated powers, liberty
would follow from each of the separate branches operating as coequal
entities authorized to discharge their delegated functions independently.
The Constitution therefore separates powers in the service of three
overarching purposes, the first of which is to prevent the concentration of
power in the hands of one branch of government. Let us call this the
democratic value of institutional equality and balance. In this respect, the
separation of powers is concerned with establishing three coequal depart-
ments, each one invested with a collection of privileges and prerogatives
no greater in the aggregate than the ones possessed by the others. The
framers' goal was to "form some balance" 62 among the branches and,
furthermore, to signal that each merited reciprocated respect.63 The re-
sult was to create a constitutional structure wherein public authority is
dispersed over mutually reinforcing and mutually limiting organs of the
national government, all toward the worthy end of thwarting the tyranny
that arises when one branch dominates over the others. So explained
Madison when he commented that "[t]he several departments being per-
fectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling
the boundaries between their respective powers, '64 gesturing to the dem-
ocratic significance of separated powers. Even Centinel, a leading voice
among Anti-Federalists, believed deeply in the promise of equal
branches.65 Equality among branches is a laudable objective in and of
itself. But equality does not follow merely from stating that the branches
are equal; each of the three branches of government can be truly equal
only if they operate autonomously and independently of the others.
Consider next in greater detail the democratic value of departmental
independence. In establishing the rules that would govern American con-
stitUtional politics, the framers were particularly attentive to the dangers
of majoritarianism that would derive from an emboldened legislature. Of
the three branches, the Legislature was the one most likely to "extend[ ]
the sphere of its activity, and draw[ ] all power into its impetuous vor-
tex."'66 The tendency of republican government, observed the framers,
was the "aggrandizement of the legislative, at the expense of the other
62. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 340 (Max Farrand ed.,
2d ed. 1937) (statement of Mr. Davie).
63. See Robert A. Burt, THE CONSTITUnON IN CONFLICT 72 (1992).
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 11, at 339 (James Madison).
65. See Centinel, Number I (Oct. 5, 1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITuTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 61, at 227, 230-31.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 11, at 333 (James Madison).
20121
SMU LAW REVIEW
departments, ' 67 by virtue of the Legislature's method of election and its
large size relative to the Executive and Judicial branches. With its domi-
nant position in the distribution of constitutional powers, the Legislature
could weaken the autonomy of the Executive and Judiciary, in so doing
exacting considerable damage to the democratic foundations of the na-
tion. What good was the separation of powers if it could not endow each
of the separated powers with independence, inquired the framers. 68 To
separate powers without achieving their independence would produce a
separation "merely nominal and incapable of producing the ends for
which it was established. '69
The separation of powers served the framers' interest in ensuring the
independence of each of the three branches. 70 The founding generation
understood independence to mean at least three things. First, it required
that no branch possess the power to obstruct the work of a sister branch
in an area over which it enjoyed plenary power. Let us call this the juris-
dictional principle. As the framers wrote, the powers delegated to one
branch "ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of
the other departments,"'71 adding for emphasis that "neither of them
ought to possess directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the
others in the administration of their respective powers."'72 At the Consti-
tutional Convention, Madison was just as resolute in his view that "[i]f it
be a fundamental principle of free Government that the Legislative, Ex-
ecutive and Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally
so that they be independently exercised. '73
Second, what follows from jurisdictional primacy is the idea of expert
specialization. The separation of powers affords each branch of govern-
ment its own sphere of jurisdiction based on the tasks it is best equipped
to perform. It is at once a matter of institutional efficiency and compe-
tence. The Legislature passes laws and distributes public dollars, the Ex-
ecutive executes those laws and spending instructions, and the Judiciary
stands in judgment of the constitutionality of the actions and inactions of
the Legislature and Executive. 74 From this general framework flows the
recognition that one branch may be best positioned to interact directly
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 11, at 341 (James Madison); see also
Gouverneur Morris, The Judiciary, the Veto, and Separation of Powers (July 21, 1787), in
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra
note 61, at 120, 122 (concurring with the other framers "in thinking [that] the public liberty
[is] in greater danger from Legislative usurpations than from any other source").
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, supra note 11, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton).
69. Id.
70. 4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 87 (Max Farrand ed.,
2d ed. 1937) (statement of Mr. Madison); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 86 (Max Farrand ed., 2d ed. 1937) (statement of Mr. Dickenson).
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 11, at 332 (James Madison).
72. Id.
73. James Madison, Election and Term of Office of the National Executive (July 17, 19,
1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DE-
BATES, supra note 61, at 114, 119 (emphasis in original).
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 11, at 522-23 (James Madison).
[Vol. 65
The Separation of Higher Powers
with foreign counterparts and another to give the product of those inter-
actions the force of law.75 That is precisely what we see in the dualism of
the Constitution's treaty-making power, pursuant to which the Senate
must ratify any treaty the President negotiates with another nation.76
Third, independence demands an outer perimeter of autonomy into
which other branches should have only limited entry. This is the principle
of self-governance. It commands concurrently "that each department
should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted,
that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the
appointment of the members of the others, '77 and that they "should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments
annexed to their offices."' 78 This autonomy therefore entails the power to
regulate its own membership and the security of compensation uncondi-
tioned on other branches' approval of the way it discharges its constitu-
tional functions.
Turn now to personal liberty, which may be understood as the main
reason for separating powers. No one has captured with greater clarity
than Montesquieu the threat to liberty that the fusion of powers risks
imposing upon civil society: "When legislative power is united with exec-
utive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there
is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that
makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically. ' 79 The framers
seized upon this justifiable concern to defend their choice of separated
powers as their prescription for liberty, 80 calling the separation of powers
an "essential precaution in favor of liberty." 81 Echoing Montesquieu's
political acuity, the framers held to the view that "[t]he accumulation of
all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. '82 And so, as
the Dean of American founding history has observed, "[t]he separation
of this governmental power, rather than simply the participation of the
people in a part of the government, became the best defense of liberty. 8 3
How does the separation of powers make liberty possible? The fram-
ers saw an important interconnection between separating powers and
preserving liberty. If we were angels, they remarked, there would be no
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 11, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton).
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 11, at 348 (James Madison).
78. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 11, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton)
("Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support.").
79. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 12, at 157.
80. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 62, at 108
(statement of Mr. Pinckney).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 11, at 323 (James Madison).
82. Id. at 324.
83. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
608 (2d ed. 1998).
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need to create the structures of government to govern our interactions. 84
But given that we are not angels, we must establish a government and,
once it is established, find ways to control it.85 For the framers, the solu-
tion was to create an arrangement of intersecting authority and overrul-
ing powers so as to encourage one department of government to restrain
the other, even as its own exercise of power would be constrained by
another department. "This policy of supplying by opposite and rival in-
terests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole
system of human affairs, private as well as public,"'86 wrote Madison,
moreover observing that "where the constant aim is to divide and arrange
the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the
other."'87 Endowing each branch with self-defense mechanisms against
the others would frustrate the concentration of power, and in turn fore-
stall tyranny. The separation of powers therefore helped negate "[t]he
propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights and to
absorb the powers of the other departments, '88 just as well as it warned
us that one branch "ought not to be left at the mercy of the other, but
ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self defence." 89
From the founding of America until today, separation of powers theory
has grown into a democratic imperative. Scholars commonly regard sepa-
rated powers as either a fundamental 90 or necessary9' feature of liberal
democracy. And with good reason, because any of the three pitfalls of
fused powers-concentrated power, institutional subservience, and the
deprivation of liberty-constitutes the very antithesis of good govern-
ment. The thought of official power converging into the hands of a single
individual or branch of government offends our sensibilities about consti-
tutional prudence and legitimate authority just as deeply as the possibility
of relegating one branch to the command of another or the threat of di-
vesting citizens of the freedom that comes only with controlling the exer-
cise of official power. The founding theory of separated powers has
therefore served American constitutional government quite well.




88. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 11, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton).
89. Id. at 495.
90. Charles McDaniel, Islam and the Global Society: A Religious Approach to Moder-
nity, 2003 BYU L. REv. 507, 540 (2003); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: To-
ward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 927 n.135 (1999);
Manuel Medina-Ortega, Comment, A Constitution for an Enlarged Europe, 32 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 393, 400 (2004).
91. Susan S. Gibson, International Economic Sanctions: The Importance of Govern-
ment Structures, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 161, 213 (1999); Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of
a Democracy Against the Terror of Suicide Bombers: Ideological and Legal Aspects, 22
Wis. INr'L L.J. 597, 655 (2004); Sammy Smooha, The Implications of the Transition to
Peace for Israeli Society, 555 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 26, 33-34 (1998).
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C. SEPARATION ON THE COURT
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the separation
of powers in much the same way constitutional theory would counsel and
the founders understood it.92 For the Court, what has mattered most has
been to respect the institutional prerogatives of each branch, including its
own.93 The Court has dutifully policed the borders separating one branch
from another, taking great care to afford the broadest possible deference
to the Legislature or the Executive when it acts directly within its prov-
ince. Let us not mistake the Court's deference for weakness, however.
When it has been so moved, the Court has taken an aggressive posture
toward the other branches in the interest of defending the integrity of the
constitutional boundaries meant to frustrate any one branch from arro-
gating or acquiring by acquiescence vast powers that would reduce sepa-
ration to a nullity.94 The Court has therefore accepted the founding
wisdom that the separation of powers serves the interest of liberty where
the branches enjoy independence within a larger framework of equality,
mutual respect, and interdependence.
Like the founding framers, the Justices of the Supreme Court have rec-
ognized that the Constitution does not prescribe a complete separation
among the branches. The Court has defined as "archaic" the thought that
separated power demands "three airtight departments of government. '95
It is simply not possible to enforce a strict separation of powers because
the founding design of independent branches within a larger framework
of interdependence creates a carefully calibrated system of shared, not
isolated, powers.96 This dovetails quite nicely with the founders' observa-
tion that, in order for liberty to take root, "[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition" 97 in a structure of separated powers. So the fram-
ers weaved joint checks and balances into their separated system of gov-
ernment, the salutary outcome being a "partial intermixture of powers
[that] even in some cases not only proper, but necessary to the mutual
defence of the several members of the government, against each other."98
The separation of powers is therefore something of a misnomer because
the powers are shared among branches and indeed often overlap.99 Some
noteworthy examples of shared powers include the power to legislate
92. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702-04 (1997); see also M. Elizabeth Ma-
gill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1127, 1148-49
(2000).
93. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454-55 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
94. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438-39; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587-88 (1952).
95. Nixon v. Adm'n of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (internal quotes omitted).
96. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADER-
sHIP 33 (1960).
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 11, at 349 (James Madison).
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 11, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton).




(Congress and the President both have a role in the legislative process) 1°°
and the power to hear cases (the Judiciary adjudicates disputes and the
Congress is endowed with the impeachment power). 10 1
Despite the intermixture of governmental powers, each branch enjoys
institutional independence in the performance of its constitutional func-
tions, according to the Supreme Court. One branch must accept the judg-
ment of another where that decision is constitutionally assigned to it. For
example, "[it] would[ ] be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separa-
tion of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent
behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit."'10 2 Simi-
larly, "[t]here would be a similar damage to the basic concept of these co-
equal branches of Government if when the Executive Branch has ade-
quate authority granted by Congress to protect 'national security' it can
choose instead to invoke the contempt power of a court to enjoin the
threatened conduct. ' 103 In the same way that the Judiciary serves the
interest of institutional independence by declining to invoke its power of
contempt to circumvent the decision or nondecision of Congress, the
Court interprets the Speech and Debate Clause's protection for congres-
sional personnel "in such a way as to insure the independence of the leg-
islature without altering the historic balance of the three co-equal
branches of Government."'04
Congress is of course not the only branch whose independence matters.
Each branch's independence must be protected. The Court has said as
much, both with respect to the Executive and itself.105 As for its own
independence, the Court has been uncompromising when it comes to pro-
tecting its turf. Neither Congress nor the Executive may annul a final
judgment of the Judiciary; that is "an assumption of Judicial power, and
therefore forbidden. '10 6 The subject of independence is also relevant for
the Presidency, particularly in the area of executive immunity. To allow
the Presidency to carry out its constitutional functions without undue ob-
struction or a paralyzing fear of reprisal, the Court has concluded that the
President is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predi-
cated on acts taken in an official capacity.10 7 The Court's concern here is
not to free the Presidency to do whatever it pleases under the cover of
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (conferring upon Congress the legislative power); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (granting the power of veto upon the President).
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (vesting upon the judiciary the power to hear "cases"
and "controversies"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (giving to the House of Representatives
the power to impeach); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (assigning to the Senate the power to
convict persons impeached by the House of Representatives).
102. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
103. Id.
104. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
105. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
135-36 (1976) (per curiam).
106. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 224 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
107. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
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full immunity. It is instead the interest of preserving the independence of
the office so that it may properly conduct the affairs of the Executive
Branch: "In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions
on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target
for suits for civil damages. '10 8 Moreover, "[c]ognizance of this personal
vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Na-
tion that the Presidency was designed to serve."' 0 9 Both the Court and
Chief Justice Burger, writing in a concurrence, agreed that presidential
immunity derives from the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. 110
Institutional independence is possible only where the branches regard
each other as coequal branches worthy of mutual respect. As the Court
wrote in a case pitting the Legislature versus the Judiciary as to which one
could properly give meaning to the Constitution, "[o]ur national experi-
ence teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the
government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches."'' In that case, Congress inter-
preted a constitutional provision in a way that risked limiting the range of
subsequent judicial interpretations of that provision. 112 The Court could
not let that congressional action stand because it was an improper legisla-
tive incursion into the judicial sphere. To interpret the Constitution is a
judicial task, wrote the Court, and other branches must respect the
Court's interpretations: "When the Court has interpreted the Constitu-
tion, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which em-
braces the duty to say what the law is. ' 113
For the Court, mutual respect entails deference to the Constitution it-
self and the responsibilities it delegates to each branch. Where the Con-
stitution vests one branch with power X, another branch cannot claim the
right to exercise that power. Not only would that run counter to the con-
stitutional allocation of functions, but it would more generally upset the
balance of powers that gives the Constitution its dynamic stability. Let us
take, for example, the power to make laws. The Constitution of course
vests the lawmaking power in the Congress." 4 Though the President has
an important role in the legislative process-the power of veto'1 5-the
President is not a lawmaker in the same sense as Congress. This is there-
fore why the Court has routinely stepped in to protect Congress's legisla-
tive province when it risked abuse or erosion at the hands of the
Executive. A prominent case helps demonstrate this observation with
108. Id. at 753.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 753-54; Id. at 758 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
111. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
112. Id. at 534-35.
113. Id. at 536.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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convincing clarity. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court
prevented the President from seizing the nation's steel-producing mills
because the President's order authorizing the seizure was itself a seizure
of the congressional lawmaking power.116 Though extraordinary circum-
stances may cause us to wish the President could make laws unencum-
bered by the vagaries of the legislative process, "[t]he Founders of this
Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both
good and bad times. 11 7 What impelled the Court's judgment was the
view that the separation of powers requires unfailing respect for the Con-
stitution as well as mutual respect among the three branches, each of
which must be given wide latitude to do its work within its own realm.
Together, the institutional independence and mutual respect advanced
by the separation of powers create the conditions for personal liberty.
That is, after all, the paramount aspiration of separating powers: "The
ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and
security of the governed." 118 For the Court, the separation of powers is a
condition precedent for liberty: "Liberty is always at stake when one or
more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers."'119
The Court has referred to the separation of powers as the device that
makes possible "freedom's first principles," specifying that "[cjhief
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the
personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of pow-
ers."1 20 The Court has made clear that it "has repeatedly emphasized
that the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty."1 21 The
Court has cast itself in the leading role of fighting the rights retrenchment
that attends the concentration of power. Recognizing that "[t]he Framers
of our Government knew that the most precious of liberties could remain
secure only if they created a structure of Government based on a perma-
nent separation of powers, 1 22 the Court has neutralized risks that, in its
view, "threaten the goal of dispersion of power, and hence the goal of
individual liberty, that separation of powers serves."'1 23
So from constitutional theory, to the Constitution's founding, and to
the practice of constitutional politics, there is a prevailing understanding
about the purpose of separating powers. The United States Constitution
does not separate powers just to separate them. It separates powers to
achieve democratic values that are deemed important, perhaps even in-
116. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
117. Id. at 589.
118. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991).
119. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
121. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
122. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
123. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 775 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Amer-
onlnc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 895 (Becker, J., concurring)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
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dispensable, to constitutional and liberal democracy. Those values are
mutually reinforcing: personal liberty, institutional equality, and depart-
mental independence. Where a branch of government discharges its con-
stitutionally delegated functions independently, the coordinate branches
function as coequal entities, each one afforded a reciprocated measure of
respect. Both as a matter of theory and application, the result is salutary
when the three branches act independently as equals within a larger
framework of interdependence and interlocking mechanisms of oversight:
those subject to the power of the state are better assured of liberty. For
the Court, the meaning and purpose of the separation of powers is there-
fore quite clear.
III. SEPARATING GOD FROM MAN
But the Supreme Court has struggled mightily to bring a similar mea-
sure of clarity to the Establishment Clause. Scholars have been critical of
what they regard as the Court's muddled establishment case law. 124 And
perhaps with good reason, because even Supreme Court Justices ac-
knowledge that the Court's establishment genealogy leaves something to
be desired.12 5 Let us be careful, though, about assigning blame to the
Court for the incoherence of the Establishment Clause. For the text of
the Establishment Clause admits of no undisputed and indisputable an-
swers to our establishment questions.12 6 Nor does the Clause's constitu-
tional history suggest clarity in its founding design or meaning.
127
Against this backdrop, the quest for constitutional clarity on the Estab-
124. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 163 (1986); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (1988); Edmond Cahn, The "Establishment of
Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1274,1274-75 (1961); Jesse H. Choper, The Establish-
ment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5, 6 (1987);
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 75 (1990);
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1989); Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984); Philip B. Kurland, The
Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1984); Steven D.
Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX.
L. REV. 955, 956 (1989).
125. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987); (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
126. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest Than Ever Before: Abandoning Pretense
and Recreating Legitimacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 380
(1995).
127. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1963); Frank Guliuzza III,
The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and the
Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 372 (1993).
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lishment Clause may be both a hopeless exercise and an illusory
expectation.
Still, the indeterminacy of the Establishment Clause's text and history
has not discouraged the Court from striving to bring clarity to it. Indeed
that is precisely what the modern Court has endeavored to do. The Su-
preme Court has developed and subsequently relied on a number of con-
stitutional tests-the neutrality principle, the Lemon test, the coercion
test, and the endorsement test-to navigate the uneven terrain of the Es-
tablishment Clause.128 Constitutional tests, of course, present risks when
deploying their criteria in a restrictive, rather than representative, fashion
because "[c]onstitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the absolutes
of the physical sciences or mathematics. ' 129 Moreover, more than one
test is a recipe for trouble, especially if the choice of which test to apply
turns on the predilections of the Court's changing majority. At bottom,
though, that each Establishment Clause test has been followed by a new
or modified test reflects the Court's pattern of devising, applying, and
subsequently consigning the prior test. For a field of law crying desper-
ately for consistency, the variability of the Court's establishment standard
poses a serious challenge to ultimately achieving it.
A. THE CORE ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLE
Nonetheless, one thing has remained unchanged as the Court has
wound its way through a series of Establishment Clause tests: the core
principle driving the Court's interpretation and application of each test
has been the separation of powers. Though the finer points of each Es-
tablishment Clause test have differed, what rests at the base of each of
them is a common commitment to achieving the democratic values inher-
ent in the separation of powers: liberty, equality, and independence. The
Court has not undertaken its analysis in these precise terms; it has instead
held fast to the taxonomy that governs each particular Establishment
Clause test. But as I will demonstrate below, as the Court has developed,
refined, and elaborated its respective tests, its establishment jurispru-
dence has been above all most concerned with preserving liberty, ensur-
ing equality, and respecting the independence of God and man. This is a
valuable discovery because it reveals a critical continuity between the
separation of powers and the separation of Church and State.
It is worth mentioning, though, that the separation analogy does not
quite fit perfectly. Although the values we hope to achieve by separating
powers reflect the same ones the Court endeavors to vindicate under the
Establishment Clause, there are limits to the analogy. None of them are
fatal to the project of applying separation theory to the relationship be-
128. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590-93; id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
129. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (upholding congressional grant pro-
gram to church-affiliated colleges and universities for construction of buildings and facili-
ties for secular educational purposes).
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tween Church and State; on the contrary, they point to important differ-
ences that can only serve to strengthen the analytical framework of
separated powers that courts can apply to the Establishment Clause. Two
of the disanalogies merit some attention. The first concerns the institu-
tional actors. When we speak of institutional equality or independence
under the separation of governmental powers, we are referring to the in-
stitutional equality or independence of the branches of government. But
in the context of Church and State, we are concerned not only with the
equality and independence of Church and State as separate entities but
also with the equality and independence of different religious faiths
under the larger umbrella of Church.
The second disanalogy concerns the instrumental and intrinsic values of
separated powers. We separate governmental powers not for the sake of
separated powers themselves, but instead in order to achieve the intrinsic
value of personal liberty. We in turn promote personal liberty from gov-
ernmental intrusion by cultivating the two instrumental values of institu-
tional equality and departmental independence-because only where
governmental departments are coequal and independent may we make
liberty possible. Otherwise, in a regime of concentrated powers where
the imbalance favors one branch, the risk is great and perhaps insur-
mountable that liberty will be compromised because there will be no
check on the disproportionately powerful branch. In the context of the
separation of Church and State, we seek the same instrumental and in-
trinsic values, but there is a third step in the sequence, in contrast to the
two that exist in separating governmental powers. Recall the sequence in
the separation of governmental powers: we foster institutional equality
and departmental independence in the service of personal liberty. Those
are the two steps in the entrenchment of the intrinsic value of liberty.
The sequence is one step longer in the relationship between Church and
State. We begin by cultivating institutional equality and departmental in-
dependence between religion and government, which in turn fosters relig-
ious liberty for religious faiths and their adherents, which in turn
promotes the personal liberty that is constitutive of republican govern-
ment and liberal democracy. The point of departure and port of call are
therefore the same, only separated by one step along the way.
Begin with the Court's first major Establishment Clause decision of the
modem era. In its first case to incorporate the Clause against the states,
the Court upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing reimbursements to
parents for public bus fare expenditures to send their children to both
public and parochial schools. 130 A taxpayer had claimed the law com-
pelled residents to pay taxes that would be used to support religious edu-
cational institutions in violation of the Establishment Clause, but the
Court disagreed.131 The Republic had been founded specifically to repu-
diate the old world practice of requiring financial and spiritual adherence




to religious institutions from nonadherents and nonbelievers. 132 Any
hint, intimated the Court, that a similar constraint would compel citizens
to support religion against their will would run contrary to the Constitu-
tion in two ways. First, it would undermine the nation's constitutional
traditions.133 And second, it would most certainly be unconstitutional as
a violation of religious liberty. 134
But beyond the actual holding itself, the Court's reasoning is instruc-
tive insofar as it shows quite clearly how the theme of separated powers
steers the majority decision. "The First Amendment," explained the
Court, "has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. ' 135 The purpose of separating these two in-
stitutions is not clear from that statement alone. One could understand
the objective of erecting a wall between two worlds as protecting one of
the two worlds from the other. But that would be an incompletely theo-
rized conception of the Establishment Clause. The Clause more accu-
rately reflects the intent to protect both worlds from themselves. In order
to protect God from man, and man from God, we must impose limits on
how the two may intersect. To this end, we can imagine, for example,
that it would be a good idea to proscribe a national church or state relig-
ion. We might also deem it appropriate to forbid the state from compel-
ling citizens to attend religious services. Those are just two illustrations
of actions the Court would forbid in the interest of shielding religion from
the intrusive reach of the state and guarding the state from the compro-
mising influence of religion. The Everson Court thought carefully about
this.136 So much so that it wrote a passage that one could read as a quasi-
legislative order detailing how to respect the integrity of the border sepa-
rating religion and the state.1 37
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious be-
liefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, open or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.138
132. Id. at 9-11.
133. Id. at 11-12.
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id. at 18.
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This is the Court's religious neutrality principle. The mental image of a
wall separating Church from State calls to mind the very same image that
we picture when we think of the separation of powers among the Legisla-
tive, Executive, and Judicial Branches of government. Each is given its
own dominion, both to protect the sanctity of its own world and also to
grant to each a measure of independence. That is the message that fol-
lows from the Court's recitation of what the state may or may not do in
tandem with religion.139 The result is to protect the democratic value of
liberty. Just as we separate powers in order to serve the interest of per-
sonal liberty, we likewise separate Church from State to afford the widest
possible latitude to individuals for their own liberty of belief, disbelief, or
nonbelief. We would therefore expect the Court to state, as it did, that
early Americans were right when they "reached the conviction that indi-
vidual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which
was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or
all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or
group. ' 140 Here we perceive that the Court's motivation in this establish-
ment case echoed a parallel interest in its separation of powers cases: to
preserve personal liberty.
As if to leave no doubt about its overriding purpose, the Court empha-
sized the motif of religion and the state occupying two separate worlds
that must remain just that.141 The Court invoked an earlier case that
made clear that God and man constitute independent realms whose effec-
tiveness and flourishing requires one to operate apart from the other:
"The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty,
rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the
other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasions of the civil
authority.' 42 These twin proscriptions against "religious interference"
into the sphere of the "temporal institutions" and vice-versa are a matter,
first and foremost, of liberty and independence. Each must stand alone,
away from the other if either is to enjoy independence and if citizens are
to be free. But second, and just as importantly, the proscription alludes
to a third tenet of separation theory: equality. Each empire must respect
the other, acknowledge the primacy the other enjoys in its own world,
and accept that claims in one world may be authoritative in one but
wholly meaningless in another. It is in this sense that each world is equal:
mutually respectful, authoritative in its province, and only advisory be-
yond its borders.
The first major Establishment Clause test-the Lemon test-came
over two decades later. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court ruled two stat-
utes unconstitutional.' 43 Under the first law, the state reimbursed paro-
chial schools for the cost of teacher salaries and teaching resources in
139. See id.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id.
143. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971).
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secular subjects; the second law authorized direct supplemental payments
by the state to parochial school teachers. Each of the statutes fell under
the weight of the three-part Lemon test that the Court created by merg-
ing the various standards used in prior establishment cases: "Every analy-
sis in this area," declared the Court, "must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years."'144
Alongside introducing the Lemon test, this case is notable for the very
same reason that Everson merits our attention: the Court, though it fo-
cused its judgment narrowly on the particular dangers of permitting close
ties between religion and government, conveyed its special solicitude for
the larger stakes hanging in the balance of the separation of powers: inde-
pendence, equality, and liberty.
Consider the three elements of the Lemon test. In order to meet the
exigencies of the Establishment Clause, the state must fulfill three condi-
tions: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion.., finally, the statute must not foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. ' 145 This test requires the Court to
engage in a fact-specific inquiry into how an impugned governmental ac-
tion either restricts or obliges action by a religious organization. The first
element-whether the governmental action is motivated by a secular pur-
pose-is a deferential investigation that calls the Court to discern govern-
mental intent.1 46 If the single or dominant purpose is in some way
religious or antireligious, the government fails the test, and its action is
deemed unconstitutional. But if there is some proof that the purpose is
secular-for instance, if the law states in its legislative history or directly
in its text that it is intended to enhance the quality of secular education in
all schools, as was the case in Lemona47-the Court will regard the legis-
lative record favorably. The second factor is the effect of the governmen-
tal action. Where the effect is to help or hinder religion, the
governmental action must fail the constitutional examination.14 8 Finally,
the Lemon test's third element is concerned with the interrelation be-
tween religion and government. If the governmental action results in
joining together Church and State in any way but among the most innoc-
uous, the action is unconstitutional. For example, in Lemon, the laws
raised a serious hazard of the latter directing the conduct of the former:
"We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and
discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular
aspects of precollege education. ' 149 This posed an intolerable risk of en-
tangling religion and government, which the Court described as a "con-
144. Id. at 612.
145. Id. at 612-13 (internal citation omitted).
146. See id. at 613; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984).
147. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
148. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92.
149. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
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flict of functions.' 50
But what lies beneath the Lemon test are our three familiar themes of
independence, equality, and liberty. Although the Court begins to unfold
its reasoning in Lemon by acknowledging that "[tihe language of the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque,"' 51 it shortly
becomes apparent that the Court has a very orderly vision of what the
text should in fact mean. Citing an earlier case, the majority writes that
the Establishment Clause was intended to guard against three evils: gov-
ernmental sponsorship of religion, publicly financed support for religion,
and official involvement in religion. 152 For the Court, religion and gov-
ernment are two autonomous authorities whose domains must remain
sovereign. This peculiar choice of words-"sovereign"-illuminates how
the Court regards the two higher powers. 153 Teachers in parochial
schools are employed by a sovereign entity, "a religious organization,
subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities. 1 54 For its
part, the state is its own sovereign entity, itself answerable to a different
collection of authorities and authoritative values.
In order to give due respect to the two sovereigns, the Court sees its
role as taking care to keep the two worlds separate and apart, each en-
joying determinative authority and independence in its own sphere, divid-
ing powers as equally as possible between them.155 Separating powers
between God and man is worth doing, according to the Court, for many
reasons. First, and perhaps foremost, is to underwrite personal liberty by
protecting religion from the corrosive influence of the government: "The
highways of church and state relationships are not likely to be one-way
streets, and the Constitution's authors sought to protect religious worship
from the pervasive powers of government.' 1 56 The second and equally
powerful justification is to keep the two orbits operating independently,
responding to different external and internal stimuli, and serving differ-
ent, perhaps even complementary, social interests: "The history of many
countries attests to the hazards of religion's intruding into the political
arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise
of religious belief.' 57 Therefore, for the Court, its mission is to shield
one entity from the other's undue interference. Only in this way may
Church and State flourish as constructive influences in civil society and as
sites of civic engagement where individuals may manifest their convic-
tions and engage with each other as social entrepreneurs. 158
150. Id.
151. Id. at 612.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 625.
154. Id. at 618.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 623.
157. Id.
158. On the broader implications of this point on First Amendment doctrine, see Rich-
ard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter: Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Relig-
ion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. 273, 282-84, 292-93 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First
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The Lemon test has birthed a number of successor tests, largely be-
cause scholars and jurists have been dissatisfied with its internal coher-
ence and external applicability. 159 Notwithstanding whether Lemon was
(or still is)16° in fact problematic, the Court has more recently marshaled
the test's various offspring to resolve establishment disputes. While the
taxonomy accompanying each test has differed, the fundamental princi-
ples underlying each inquiry have remained unchanged. 161 Indepen-
dence, equality, and liberty-these are the values that drive the Court's
inquiry under the endorsement and coercion tests that have emerged
since the decline of the Lemon test. This speaks to the considerable con-
sistency that governs the Court's approach to mediating the boundary
separating Church from State.
Both the endorsement and coercion tests speak to the same interests as
the Lemon test. The endorsement test sprang from a concurring opinion
upholding the constitutionality of a municipality's decision to include a
nativity scene in its local Christmas display. 62 In Lynch v. Donnelly, the
majority applied the original Lemon test to reach its judgment, 63 finding
that the municipality had not strayed beyond what the Establishment
Clause requires. 64 In a concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
opted to "write separately to suggest a clarification of our Establishment
Clause doctrine.' 165 That clarification spawned the endorsement test,
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 107,
114-15 (2009).
159. See, e.g., Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contempo-
rary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129 (1990); John H. Mans-
field, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1984); Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon Is a
Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 1
(1997); Raul M. Rodriguez, God Is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1155 (1992); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause
in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987);
Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997 (1986).
160. The Lemon test may admittedly have been followed by new tests used to assess the
validity of state action under the Establishment Clause, but it has not been superseded.
Indeed, it has been invoked even after the development of newer establishment tests. See,
e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. The same is true of the Court's updated version of the Lemon test, which was
announced in 1997. The Lemon test no longer consists of three parts; the Court modified it
to require two principal inquiries. The first probes the purpose of the governmental action,
an inquiry that remains unchanged from the original test. The second inquiry evaluates the
effect of the governmental action. This new second inquiry effectively merges the second
and third inquiries from the original test into it a new subsidiary three-part analysis, which
sets forth three criteria for determining whether the governmental action has the effect of
advancing religion: (1) whether it results in governmental indoctrination; (2) whether it
defines individuals or groups by reference to religion; and (3) whether it creates an exces-
sive entanglement. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
162. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 681-85.
164. Id. at 687.
165. Id.
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which emerged from her restatement of the purpose and effect elements
of the Lemon test.
What the Lemon test really meant to do, concluded Justice O'Connor,
was to neutralize the risk that government would give its approval or dis-
approval to, or be seen as giving its approval or disapproval to, religion.
Her analysis rearticulated the purpose and effect elements of the Lemon
test in terms of endorsement: "The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks
whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of relig-
ion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorse-
ment or disapproval.' 1 66 The result was the endorsement test, which re-
quires that "a government practice not have the effect of communicating
a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is
only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community.' 67 Deploying this refinement to the Lemon
test, Justice O'Connor concluded that the nativity scene's presence in the
Christmas display did not violate the endorsement test because it was
merely a government acknowledgement of religion. 168 In her view, when
the state acknowledges the importance of religion to some of its mem-
bers, it severs "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public oc-
casions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging recognition
of what is worthy of appreciation in society.' 69 Therefore the display did
not go too far because "[i]t cannot fairly be understood to convey a mes-
sage of government endorsement of religion,"'170 according to Justice
O'Connor.
We can perceive how the endorsement test mirrors the Everson and
Lemon courts' shared attentiveness to the democratic values of separated
powers. The values of independence, liberty, and equality become appar-
ent when we read Justice O'Connor's reasons for urging the state to re-
frain from endorsing or disapproving religion: "Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disap-
proval sends the opposite message.' 7 ' Recognizing that Justice
O'Connor's anxiety stems from the fear that government would side with
all religion, a particular religion, or against religion, governmental en-
dorsement or infringement of religion exacts deleterious consequences
for independence and liberty. When the state endorses or disapproves
religion, that action undermines its own independence as well as the inde-
pendence of the religion. It moreover compromises the liberty of the in-
166. Id. at 690.
167. Id. at 692.
168. Id. at 692-93.
169. Id. at 693.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 688.
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dividuals who perceive the state as placing a value in their own status as
either believers or nonbelievers. Equality, too, is implicated in the en-
dorsement test insofar as a governmental endorsement or disapproval of
one religion over another disrupts the balance that should govern among
religions and also among religion, nonreligion, and irreligion. The state
cannot claim to be, nor can it be perceived to be, a fair umpire when it
either elevates one religion above others or demotes one below the rest,
or also when it suggests to individuals and the community that one of
religion, nonreligion, or irreligion enjoys most favored standing. That is,
in the final analysis, what Justice O'Connor believes was the real peril-
the way third parties will react to official action either championing or
resisting religion, or a particular religion. 172
The coercion test is no different on this score. First articulated in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy in response to what he
deemed "[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon,"'1 73 the test states that "govern-
ment may not coerce anyone to support or participate-in any religion or
its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do So. ' '174 Justice
Kennedy created this test to determine whether a municipality could law-
fully display a creche and a menorah on public property during the holi-
day season. 175 He concluded that both displays were permissible under
the Establishment Clause because neither display had the effect of coerc-
ing observers to follow the tenets or participate in the celebration of a
particular religion, nor did they serve to distance citizens from their gov-
ernment in a way that would call into question the neutrality of the state.
Justice Kennedy took great care to outline why, in his view, neither the
creche nor the menorah had the effect of coercing belief or action:
There is no suggestion here that the government's power to coerce
has been used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in
any way. No one was compelled to observe or participate in any
religious ceremony or activity. Neither the city nor the county con-
tributed significant amounts of tax money to serve the cause of one
religious faith. The creche and the menorah are purely passive sym-
bols of religious holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message
conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn
their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any
other form of government speech. There is no realistic risk that the
creche and the menorah represent an effort to proselytize or are oth-
erwise the first step down the road to an establishment of religion.176
172. Id. at 690.
173. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted).
175. Id. at 663.
176. Id. at 664.
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Both displays were, for Justice Kennedy, no more than a harmless "act
of recognition or accommodation" by the government that was both
"passive and symbolic" and from which "any intangible benefit to relig-
ion [was] unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment. ' 177 Justice
Kennedy saw no threat to these displays because "[a]bsent coercion, the
risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommo-
dation is minimal."' 178 That these religious displays could possibly exert a
coercive influence was therefore not lost on Justice Kennedy.
In much the same way that we worry in the school context about what
Justice Kennedy described as the "subtle coercive pressure" that teach-
ers' religious practices may inflict on elementary and secondary school
students, 179 we may likewise worry about the effect that a state's expres-
sion of a particular religious preference would have on its residents.
Would a citizen feel compelled to adhere to that religion? Would a state
preference known to the public make it less comfortable for persons to
manifest their competing faith beliefs freely and openly? Those are the
worries that motivated Justice Kennedy's coercion test. It is one thing,
wrote Justice Kennedy, for the state to participate in public speech. 180
That is acceptable in a way that government subscription to religion is
not. After all, "[s]peech is protected by ensuring its full expression even
when the government participates, for the very object of some of our
most important speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as
its own,"'181 wrote Justice Kennedy. But when it comes to religion, "the
government is not a prime participant, for the framers deemed religious
establishment antithetical to the freedom of all."'1 82 The reason the Con-
stitution protects speech and religion by permitting government partici-
pation in the former and forbidding it in the latter is precisely that "[t]he
First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mecha-
nisms."'183 That reason, for Justice Kennedy, comes down to the coercive
power of the state: "The explanation lies in the lesson of history that was
and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the
hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of relig-
ious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce." 184 The conse-
quence would be disastrous for freedom of thought, belief, and religion:
"A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not
imposed." 185
Coercion is really about choice. To coerce someone is to narrow the
choices before her. When the state coerces an individual, it divests her of
177. Id. at 662.
178. Id.
179. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).




184. Id. at 591-92.
185. Id. at 592.
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the full range of choices that she would otherwise enjoy absent that coer-
cive power. The coercion test therefore strikes at the heart of the nefari-
ous effect of limiting or forcing the choices individuals make as members
of their community. If individuals see the state taking a side in the choice
between religion and irreligion, or the choice among religions, their own
choice could no longer properly be described as free. It would be a con-
strained choice, perhaps even a compelled one, but certainly not one en-
tirely free of influences commonly regarded as improper in a liberal
democracy. 18 6 In this sense, the coercion test is concerned with the lib-
erty interest that is so central in separation of powers analysis.
Liberty, wrote Montesquieu, the fountainhead of separation of powers
theory, demands the power to choose freely and securely. 187 The free-
dom of choice derives from and indeed reinforces the first principle of
civil society and legitimate authority: self-government, both in the sense
of membership in a larger community governed according to the consent
of the community but also in the more personal sense of governing one's
own personal province. That, for Montesquieu, was the meaning of lib-
erty.188 It produces a "tranquility of spirit" within individuals189-the
very tranquility that, according to Justice Kennedy, is upset by the coer-
cive influence of the state when it encroaches upon the religious choices
of individuals. 190 Hence, the coercion test at its core seeks to protect the
democratic value of liberty. The coercion test also engages the equality
and independence interests of the separation of powers. As to the for-
mer, the coercion test is attentive to equality among religions and as
among religion, irreligion, and nonreligion. And as to the latter, the coer-
cion test keeps the state and religion independent, both as a matter of
reality and perception.
Peering into the Supreme Court's establishment tests leaves us with an
interesting observation: though the tests use different vocabulary and ap-
ply different standards, what they share in common is their objectives.
Their narrow objective is of course to give the Court a framework to de-
cide Establishment Clause disputes. The neutrality principle, the Lemon
test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test-each of them endeav-
ors to do that, some perhaps with more success than others. But more
broadly, what each test is really concerned with is how best to serve the
democratic values of the separation of powers: liberty, equality, and inde-
pendence. Whether the standard is the Everson benchmark of keeping
an impregnable wall separating religion from government; the Lemon cri-
teria of a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor in-
186. See Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Ex-
perience and the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 647, 672-73 (1993) (describing the nonestablishment norm as one of several "practi-
cal principle[s] good for all liberal democracies").
187. MoNrEsouIEu, supra note 12, at 157-59.
188. Id. at 159.
189. Id. at 155.
190. Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92.
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hibits religion and sufficient distance between religion and government;
the endorsement test's requirement of no official sanction or disapproval;
or even the coercion's insistence on free choice, the overriding ambition
of each inquiry is to preserve liberty, ensure equality, and respect the
independence of God and man.
B. OUR Two MASTERS
Church and State are the two institutional forms through which per-
sons see their aspirations and anxieties most vividly reflected. We design
the organs of our government both to achieve the social objectives to
which we aspire and to thwart the dangers we associate with human frail-
ties that even democratic governance tends to exacerbate. We likewise
associate with, and often define ourselves according to, religion and relig-
ious organizations. We do so for many reasons, including the search for
community, redemption, and the solace and security that comes from ac-
countability for our thought and action. Inasmuch as one or the other
may exert comprehensive and controlling authority upon our conscience
and conduct, religion and government serve as our two masters. Some-
times competing and sometimes complementary, the interactions be-
tween Church and State commonly breed divisive tensions that test their
colliding claims to our continuing fidelity.
The impulse to divide religion and government is commonly thought to
spring from the fear that religion will exert a nefarious influence over the
state.191 But as Stephen Carter writes, this view is "nonsense-pardona-
ble nonsense, but nonsense all the same."'1 92 The origins of the separa-
tion of Church and State in the United States derive not from the
objective to protect the state from religion but rather to protect religion
from the state. "[I]n other words," writes Martin Steven, "by keeping the
State away from churches, religion would be protected within the political
system. '193 Indeed, the famous metaphor of the wall, which is typically
attributed to Thomas Jefferson, 194 has not only been mischaracterized as
intended to safeguard the province of government from the realm of re-
ligion,' 95 but it was actually developed nearly two centuries earlier by
191. See, e.g., C. TRUETT BAKER, CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION WITHOUT DOMINA-
TION 181 (2010); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 5 (2002); WIL-
LIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: AMERICA'S FOUNDATION IN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 158 (1986).
192. Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 293, 297 (2002).
193. MARTIN STEVEN, CHRISTIANITY AND PARTY POLITICS: KEEPING THE FAITH 149
(2011).
194. See Robert L. Tsai, Democracy's Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2006).
195. See Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71
B.U. L. REV. 455, 481 n.137 (1991) ("When the imagination of Roger Williams built the
wall of separation, it was not because he was fearful that without such a barrier the arm of
the church would extend its reach. It was, rather, the dread of the worldly corruptions
which might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not main-




Roger Williams. 196 For Williams, what mattered most was the sacrality of
religion, which he called "the garden," and the imperative to shield it
from the impurities of government:
[T]he faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the
world, abundantly prove that the church of the Jews under the Old
Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians under the
New Testament in the antitype, were both separate from the world,
and that when they opened the gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the Garden of the church and the wilderness of the world,
God broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made
his garden a wilderness, as at this day. And therefore if he will ever
please to restore his garden and Paradise again, it must of necessity
be walled in peculiarly to himself from the world, and all that shall
be saved out of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilder-
ness of [the] world and added to his church or garden. 19 7
Religion, then, according to Williams, may remain pure only where it is
removed from the purview of government. 198 For its part, government
appears to have a dual burden: first, to stay away from religion in the
interest of ensuring its continuing vitality and purity and, second, to re-
move any barriers that may stand in the way of persons who wish to man-
ifest their religion and express their religious beliefs. These twin negative
and positive duties serve the ultimate end of keeping Church and State
separate while concurrently affording religious institutions the respect
they have come to command in the American tradition.
The Court appears, at least on some occasions, to accept Williams' the-
ory of religious sacrality. 199 For the Court, religion is sacred and it must
be protected from the reach of the state. Yet the Court would insist that
the reverse-that the state is special and must not be merged with relig-
ion-is also true: "Government need not resign itself to ineffectual diffi-
dence because of exaggerated fears of contagion of or by religion, so long
as neither intrudes unduly into the affairs of the other. °20 0 Religion and
government occupy different spheres of authority, "different jurisdic-
tions" according to Edward Eberle, who developed this idea with refer-
ence to Williams: "Williams' approach was to identify the essential
196. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1565-66 (1989).
197. Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined, and Answered, in
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: SELECIONS FROM THE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 46, 70
(James Calvin Davis ed., 2008).
198. See id.
199. There are some instances in which this is not true, namely school vouchers and
cases involving the Ten Commandments. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 644, 649 (2002) (holding that constitutional voucher program must have valid secular
purpose); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005) (invalidating Ten Com-
mandments display).
200. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (invalidating special state tax
benefit for religious publications); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) (stating that "[s]pecial tax benefits, however, cannot be
squared with the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of this Court").
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attributes of each government and religion as a way of distinguishing one
from the other.20 1 By so distinguishing the two, they could remain sepa-
rate from one another. Thus, the affairs or disputes of one would not
effect the other. ' 20 2 And what are the respective functions of religion
and government? "The main role of government, in Williams' view, was
to preserve law and order, and promote social peace. The main role of
religion was to facilitate communication with God so that one could find
a path to salvation. For Williams, these goals were not incompatible. 20 3
By keeping to their respective spheres of authority, thought Williams,
Church and State could exert determinative influence over their adher-
ents on the matters that properly fell within their jurisdiction. Hence, the
separation of Church from State.
Although the conventional narrative purports that liberal democracy
demands the strict separation of Church from State,2°4 social and political
reality tell a different story. We know very well from centuries of consti-
tutional government that religion and government cannot be kept en-
tirely separate. There must necessarily be some intermingling of the two,
if not to allow religion and religious organizations to operate with the
protection of the state, then at least to require the state to create suffi-
cient space for citizens to manifest the sacrality of our religious convic-
tions. The Supreme Court has recognized as much. Just as the Court has
reached the conclusion that a strict application of the separation of pow-
ers is not possible in the context of allocating constitutional responsibility
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the national
government, it is equally unworkable to expect the Court to enforce a
strict separation of constitutional authority between the two higher pow-
ers of Church and State.
If anything can be gleaned with certainty from the Court's Establish-
ment jurisprudence, it is that there is no plainly discernible border sepa-
rating the realm of religion from the province of government. Some may
wish to establish clear markers between Church and State but efforts to
this end have more often than not proven fruitless. In Agostini v. Felton,
the Court acknowledged that "[i]nteraction between church and state is
inevitable, and we have always tolerated some level of involvement be-
tween the two."'20 5 More than a series of fleeting overlaps, however, it is
a fact of human interaction that religion and government will intersect at
201. Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 457 (1999).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., L. ALl KHAN, A THEORY OF UNIVERSAL DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE
END OF HISTORY 15 (2003); MILAN ZAFIROVSKI, LIBERAL MODERNITY AND ITS ADVERSA-
RIES 434 (2007); Stephen L. Carter, Can Religion Tolerate Democracy? (And Vice Versa?),
in DEMOCRATIC VISTAS: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 67, 70
(Jedediah Purdy ed., 2004); Anthony J. Langlois, Liberalism, the Ethics of Citizenship and
Religious Belief, in POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE NEW CENTURY: PHILOSOPHICAL RE-
FLECTIONS 92, 99 (Philip Andrew Quadrio & Carrol Besseling eds., 2009).
205. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
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important public and private junctions given that "the complexities of
modern life inevitably produce some contact" between Church and
State.206 It belies the course of contemporary government to believe any-
thing but that "[a] system of government that makes itself felt as perva-
sively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths with the
church. '20 7 Although it is true that the Court has strived to maintain
neutrality between religion and nonreligion, and among religions, "a her-
metic separation of [religion and government] is an impossibility it has
never required. ' 20 8 Therefore the view that anything but a mingling of
religion and government will govern our interactions with ourselves, our
communities, and our state is theoretically and practically unsustainable.
As the Court has written recently in this vein, "[t]he Constitution does
not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgement of religion's
role in society. '20 9
The Court has long conceded the inevitable intermixture of Church
and State. As early as the era of the Establishment Clause's incorpora-
tion against the states, the Court spoke to the core of the reason why
strictly separating Church from State is undesirable. According to the
Court, were it to press the enforcement of an impermeable boundary be-
tween religion and government, such a policy would render them alien to
each other, locking them into a path-dependent, antagonistic relationship.
The following passage describes from the Court's perspective the far-
reaching costs of insisting on the strict separation of higher powers:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it
studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the
common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would
be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.
Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Munici-
palities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to
religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their
places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our leg-
islative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the
Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holi-
day; "so help me God in our courtroom oaths"-these and all other
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. 210
Yet the Court allows these and other seemingly violative religious prac-
tices to unfold in the public square. One possible justification for casting
aside an exacting standard of separation between religion and govern-
ment is the pursuit of neutrality and the guarantee of equal access as
206. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
207. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976).
208. Id. at 746.
209. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).
210. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
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between the secular and sectarian. This argument has surfaced in the
context of religious organizations petitioning for permission to use public
spaces.
Government programs adopting neutrality toward religion and grant-
ing equal access to religious organizations commonly find no difficulty
satisfying the Establishment Clause. The reason relates to the Court's
historical resistance toward, and its recognition of the impracticability of,
erecting a truly impenetrable wall between the secular and sacred. The
profound bonds between the two indeed belie the wall metaphor that has
endured for so long. It should come as little surprise that the Court
would invalidate a policy allowing all but religious after-school clubs from
holding meetings and conducting activities on public school property.211
This policy constituted a view contrary to the very aspiration of the Es-
tablishment Clause, the intent of which is surely not to favor religion over
nonreligion, but certainly to permit the sectarian to stand alongside the
secular when the dispute concerns equal use and access.
The same principle militates in favor of granting accommodations for
religious practices. One case in particular demonstrates this point: Cutter
v. Wilkinson.2 12 The case involved a suit filed by adherents of four un-
conventional religious traditions who argued collectively that prison offi-
cials had failed to make appropriate accommodations to permit them to
observe the tenets of their respective faiths.213 The Court ruled in favor
of the petitioners in large part because they were under the institutional
control of the state, "unable freely to attend to their [own] religious
needs, '214 and were "therefore dependent on the government's permis-
sion and accommodation for exercise of their religion. 21 5 Although the
Court confirmed the state's duty to accommodate religious practices
where possible, the state was not required "to elevate accommodation of
religious observances over [a public] institution's need to maintain order
and safety. '216 But there is a lot of space between accommodating relig-
ion and exalting it to the detriment of the public good. The Court was
not encouraging the latter but it was certainly encouraging public institu-
tions to act in as tolerant and affirming a manner as possible to create
enough space for persons to practice their religious faith.
C. THE NONESTABLISHMENT NORM
The challenge of liberal democracy is to foster a constitutional culture
that invites religious adherence, belief, and expression while not going so
211. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); see also Rosenberger v.
Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995) (holding that a public university
must make available a financial subsidy to student religious organization on the same basis
as it does to other student organizations).
212. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
213. Id. at 712.
214. Id. at 721.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 722.
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far as to require it. The nonestablishment norm strives to do just that.
Whether it actually achieves it, however, is another question altogether.
Nonetheless, one of the strongest justifications of the nonestablishment
norm is to ensure equality among religion, nonreligion, and irreligion,
and also among religions themselves. Where the state favors one religion
over others, equality becomes unattainable because the reality of social
ordering forecloses the possibility of the nonfavored or disfavored reli-
gions acceding to the same benefits accorded to the chosen religion.
What is more, the self-perception of their own inequality may exert con-
scious or subconscious constraints on what nonfavored or disfavored reli-
gions allow themselves to do and the ways in which they manifest their
religious beliefs.
As the Court noted in Larson v. Valente, the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses are mutually reinforcing only when religions are treated
equally by a neutral state: "Madison's vision-freedom for all religion
being guaranteed by free competition between religions-naturally as-
sumed that every denomination would be equally at liberty to exercise
and propagate its beliefs. '217 But, added the Court, "such equality would
be impossible in an atmosphere of official denominational preference. ''218
We therefore hold to the nonestablishment norm partly for the very same
principle we separate governmental powers horizontally: to establish coe-
qual branches, none endowed with greater constitutional legitimacy than
the other, allowing all three to interact sometimes cooperatively and
sometimes competitively in the larger interest of liberty.
Perception is crucial to the nonestablishment norm. Both the self-per-
ception of religion or religions that may be treated differently from
others, as referenced above, and the third-party perception of the rela-
tionship between religion and government are important to sustaining the
even-handedness for which we strive under nonestablishment. As to the
latter, the legitimacy of both Church and State is called into question
when they are seen as operating in tandem or even too closely together.
This line of thought helps explain the Court's decision in Larkin v. Gren-
del's Den, a case challenging the power of a church, under a Massachu-
setts statute, to object to liquor license applications submitted by
businesses within a 500-foot radius of the church.219 The Court invali-
dated the law for a number of reasons, but one principal reason was the
Court's anxiety about how the fusion of sectarian and secular powers
would be perceived by citizens.220 According to the Court, the Constitu-
tion cannot allow religion to be seen as trumping government or as deriv-
ing a benefit unavailable to other institutions: "[Tihe mere appearance of
a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a
217. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) (rejecting a statute exempting from
bureaucratic requirements only those religious organizations meeting a certain threshold of
member contributions).
218. Id.
219. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).
220. Id. at 126.
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significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of
the power conferred."'221 There were therefore two items breeding
unease in the majority's collective mind: first, the perception of fairness
and equality, and second, the notion of institutional competence, specifi-
cally that legislative authority can be discharged in the secular world only
by government, not by religion. When the two merge, that union com-
promises both government and religion. Undermining the authority of
each separate sphere is precisely what happens to the organs of the na-
tional government-the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary-
when the norm of separated powers gives way to a fusion of powers.
IV. THE FORMS AND FRONTIERS OF SEPARATING
HIGHER POWERS
Proving that the Supreme Court's establishment case law reflects the
structure and interests of separation of powers analysis does little to bring
constitutional clarity to the Establishment Clause. It is a useful point of
departure, but without more it only complicates our inquiry. The discov-
ery of an intellectual and jurisprudential continuity between the separa-
tion of Church and State and the separation of powers leaves unanswered
serious questions about the relative rank of religion and government in
the hierarchy of constitutional authority. Why? Because the separation
of powers folds within itself two types of separation, and we must be clear
about which of the two we wish to engage when applying separation of
powers analysis to the separation of Church and State. The standing of
religion relative to government varies according to which of the two
forms of separated powers we determine should govern the relationship
between the two higher powers.
A. WHICH SEPARATION?
The separation of powers manifests itself in two ways: vertically and
horizontally. When we refer to the separation of powers, we think most
commonly of the horizontal division of powers among the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Branches of the same level of government. Both
the national government and its state counterparts separate powers in
this way: nationally, the Congress operates alongside the Judiciary and
the Presidency. At the state level, a bicameral or unicameral legislature
shares official power with the state judiciary and the governor. In con-
221. Id. at 125-26; see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,409-10 (1985) (raising doubts
about the propriety of the state becoming "enmeshed with a given denomination in mat-
ters of religious significance" because "the freedom of religious belief of those who are not
adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying
the involvement is largely secular," and also because "the freedom of even the adherents
of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters"); Grand
Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (expressing concern about "whether the
symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is suffi-
ciently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorse-
ment, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices").
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trast, the vertical separation of powers divides power between two or
more levels of government; we call this federalism. Under this structure
of constitutional government, the national government enjoys certain
powers and the state governments enjoy others. To illustrate, consider a
state composed of two levels of government: a national government and
subnational states. A constitution could adopt several design strategies to
allocate powers between these two levels of government. For example, a
constitution could entrench two lists of specific powers that belong to two
levels of government, one for each. 222 Alternatively, it could entrench
three lists, one cataloguing the exclusive powers of each of the two levels
of government and a third list identifying areas of shared powers.223 Still
another option is to grant specific powers to the states and leave all
others in the hands of the national authority.224 The United States Con-
stitution does something different: it enumerates the powers of the na-
tional government and confers all residual powers upon the states. 225
Federalism is just as much a separation of powers as the traditional
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It is one of the
principal means by which democracies diffuse power.226 One of the first
significant studies devoted to the subject of vertically separated powers
drew similarities between federalism and the horizontal separation of
powers, noting that we rely on both to make constructive contributions to
good governance and public administration. 227 The diffusion of power in
American federalism, like its horizontal equivalent, is correctly thought
to serve the interest of liberty. Both serve the same ends of promoting
liberty and frustrating the rise of tyranny. 228 As Laurence Tribe has writ-
ten in his leading tome on constitutional law, "along both dimensions,
that of federalism as well as that of separation of powers, it is institutional
interdependence rather than functional independence that best summa-
rizes the American idea of protecting liberty by fragmenting power. '229
Madison also made plain the connection between federalism and liberty:
222. See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.) (listing powers of the Canadian federal Parliament); id. § 92
(listing powers of the Canadian provincial legislatures).
223. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 246 (Seventh Schedule).
224. The South African Constitution's distribution of powers adheres to this model in-
sofar as it expressly grants specific powers to the subnational level of government but au-
thorizes the national government to override the actions of a subnational government if it
is in the national interest. See S. AR. CONST. ch. IV, § 44 (1996).
225. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III (vesting enumerated powers in the three branches of the
national government); U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the States and the people all
powers not delegated to the national government).
226. Deborah Z. Cass, The 'Constitutionalization' of International Trade Law: Judicial
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12
EUR. J. INT'L L. 39, 55 (2001).
227. Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation
of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (2003).
228. Janice C. Griffith, Judicial Funding and Taxation Mandates: Will Missouri v. Jen-
kins Survive Under the New Federalism Restraints?, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 483, 603-04 (2000).
229. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
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In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the peo-
ple. The different governments will contruol each other; at the same
time that each will be controuled by itself.
2 30
Liberty becomes the product of federalism for a number of reasons.
First, its diffusion of power guards against the concentration of power and
the tyranny that may follow from it.231 Second, it invites multiple points
of entry for citizens hoping to improve political outcomes,232 and as a
result the right to vote becomes only one of several ways of holding ac-
countable public officials. 233 Third, it grants the several states an impor-
tant deliberative voice in the national legislative process.2 34 Relatedly,
the constraints of the national lawmaking procedures themselves protect
the liberty-promoting federal structure of the Constitution.
235
Yet whether federalism advances liberty turns on whether citizens per-
ceive both levels of government as legitimate and independent entities.
236
For absent the reality and perception of institutional independence, the
separation of powers cannot fulfill its democracy-enhancing aspirations.
Perhaps, then, we can understand the theory of dual federalism as an
effort to vindicate the independence of both levels of government. Dual
federalism operates as a kind of "constitutional preemption," 237 where
"the state and federal governments each possess[ ] distinct 'spheres' of
regulatory authority in which their respective authority [is] exclusive, so
that any intrusion by one level of government into the other's sphere [is]
unconstitutional. '238 This involves three subsidiary principles, each nec-
essary, but on its own insufficient, to give an adequately theorized ac-
count of dual federalism: first, the national and state governments possess
exclusive and distinguishable powers; second, the national and state gov-
ernments are both authoritative in their respective areas of jurisdiction;
and third, the Judiciary patrols the border separating national from state
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 11, at 351 (James Madison).
231. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
243, 272 (2005).
232. Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (2004).
233. James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Politi-
cal Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 966 (1997).
234. Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union:
Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1655 (2002).
235. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1372 (2001).
236. Laura E. Little, Envy and Jealousy: A Study of Separation of Powers and Judicial
Review, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 104 (2000).
237. John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
and the Text of Article I1, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 243 (1997).
238. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judi-
cial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 88 n.61 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
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jurisdiction.2 39 The states and the national government are "separate and
distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other,
within their respective spheres. '2 40 Dual federalism is therefore a vigor-
ous defense of independence. 241
But dual federalism creates a model of dueling sovereignties. The strict
division of labor between the center and the periphery gives rise to the
creation and entrenchment of government empires that each level of gov-
ernment marshals its resources to protect and indeed expand.242 The re-
sult is "the idea of competing, antagonistic governmental entities each
vying for a larger share of the regulatory pie at the expense of the
other. 2 43 This moves federalism beyond simply fostering independence
between the national and state governments to more ominously manag-
ing a turbulent antagonism between the two sovereigns. 244 It generates a
"spirit of rivalry, '245 which is perhaps not what we want of our public
authorities. We may instead prefer a model of cooperative federalism,
which similarly regards the national and state governments as autono-
mous entities, each enjoying some measure of immunity from the
other,2 46 but which sees the federalist form as encouraging complemen-
tary, not competing, interactions. 247 Although cooperative federalism
conceives of the two levels of government as independent, 248 it nonethe-
less also situates the national and state governments along a constitu-
tional hierarchy. In this respect, "cooperative federalism ... is a concept
of partnership between the national and state governments that acknowl-
edges the fact of national supremacy and the reality that the terms of the
partnership are almost entirely fixed by the strength and power of the
central government."249 The result of cooperative federalism, in contrast
239. Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-
Westphalian World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 118 (2007).
240. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858).
241. See, e.g., K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 15 (1947); Alison Grey Ander-
son, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L.
REV. 813, 837 (1984); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV.
1, 16 (1950); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 184 (2005).
242. For a discussion of empire-building in the context of federal relations, see Daryl J.
Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
938-50 (2005).
243. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1887 (1995).
244. Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A
Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 864 (1985).
245. Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "Industrial Policy" in American Development,
1790-1987, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 415, 420 (1987).
246. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 816
(1998).
247. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmen-
tal Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 175-77 (2006).
248. Richard B. Stewart, Federalism: Allocating Responsibility Between the Federal and
State Courts, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 957-58 (1985); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 664-65 (2001).
249. 1 CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: POWERS OF GOVERN-
MENT 270 (9th ed. 2009).
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to the defensive posture of dual federalism, is an environment of "polite
conversations and collaborative discussions"250 about how to make inter-
governmental relations work constructively. Nevertheless, dual and co-
operative federalism share the belief that the national and state
governments are independent branches in the vertical separation of pow-
ers, both possessing constitutionally entrenched rights and
responsibilities.
Are Church and State dueling or cooperative sovereigns? We would
expect some guidance from the Supreme Court in its capacity as the um-
pire of the constitutional boundaries separating horizontal, vertical, and
higher powers. The Court has indeed answered the question whether re-
ligion and government stand as equals in the hierarchy of American con-
stitutional law. But the problem is that the Court has answered the
question in more than one way. These divergent answers are the origin
and the continuing fount of the incoherence that has ensnared the Estab-
lishment Clause. Since the founding of the new republic, the Supreme
Court has vacillated among three approaches to the Establishment
Clause and given three different, incompatible, and indeed contradictory
answers to the relative ranking of religion and government. Most com-
monly, the Court has invoked the horizontal separation of powers to cast
Church and State as institutional equals, with either Church or State des-
ignated as primus inter pares, or first among equals. On other occasions,
the Court has applied the theory of vertically separated powers to elevate
State above Church. Less frequently, the Court has appealed to the verti-
cal separation of powers to elevate Church over State.
B. CHURCH AND STATE
What generally informs the Court's rendering of the Church-State
boundary is the horizontal separation of powers. Under this theory of
separated powers, Church and State are coequal entities in the project of
governing, each entitled to sovereign deference in the discharge of their
respective institutional missions. There are two dimensions-a negative
prohibition and a positive requirement-to this form of separation be-
tween the two higher powers. First, the horizontal separation of powers
entails a negative prohibition that limits how one higher power may inter-
relate with the other. Specifically, just as government may not interfere
in the autonomous sphere of religion, neither may religion tread into the
domain of government. Second, the theory of horizontally separated
powers recognizes that Church and State possess competencies both di-
vergent and intersecting. There are tasks that only government can exe-
cute capably and other tasks that only religion can perform reliably, and
we therefore grant to each higher power the respect and independence
that its expertise commands. As a corollary, there also exist tasks that
both religion and government can carry out competently. Where that is
250. Jessica Buiman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1271 (2009).
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the case, the horizontal separation of powers imposes a positive duty
upon government to recognize that religion is just as well-equipped as the
government to accomplish that particular task.
In the first Supreme Court case to set Church and State as institutional
equals, the Court ruled that a religious institution could deliver medical
care just as effectively as a public one. The case was Bradfield v. Rob-
erts,251 and it concerned a suit against the Treasurer of the United States,
the former arguing that a congressional appropriation to Providence Hos-
pital, which was operated by a body organized under the Roman Catholic
Church, violated the Establishment Clause.252 Congress had earlier
granted a corporate charter to the hospital and was now disbursing
$30,000 to it for new construction. 253 The plaintiff objected that this con-
gressional appropriation would run afoul of the constitutional provision
prohibiting Congress from passing "a law respecting a religious establish-
ment. ' '254 The Court was quick to correct the plaintiff about the correct
wording of the Establishment Clause, which did not prohibit laws "re-
specting a religious establishment" but more accurately laws "respecting
an establishment of religion," an important difference, according to the
Court.2 55 The Establishment Clause does not bar laws respecting
churches or other religious institutions; it only bars laws creating an es-
tablishment of religion, a distinction that was either lost on or distorted
by the plaintiff. Furthermore, wrote the Court, it was appropriate that
the hospital had been duly incorporated without reference to the religion
of the incorporators because it is not the role of the state to inquire into
the religious beliefs of incorporators:
Nothing is said about religion or about the religious faith of the
incorporators of this institution in the act of incorporation ....
•.. Whether the individuals who compose the corporation under
its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or
Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other religious or-
ganization, or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest conse-
quence with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor can the
individual beliefs upon religious matters of the various incorporators
be inquired into.256
The reason it was inappropriate to inquire into the religious beliefs of
the operators of Providence Hospital concerns the precise function of the
institution. Though it may have been operated by a Roman Catholic
group, the hospital was performing a secular role: giving medical care.
And since there was neither allegation that Providence Hospital confined
its services to adherents of the Roman Catholic faith nor any concern that
251. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
252. Id. at 291-93.
253. Id. at 295-96.
254. Id. at 293.
255. Id. at 297.
256. Id. at 297-98.
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it had violated the terms of its secular charter,257 the plaintiff could not
prove that the congressional appropriation to Providence Hospital consti-
tuted an impermissible establishment of religion. It therefore did not
matter that the hospital was run by religious personnel: "It is simply the
case of a secular corporation being managed by people who hold to the
doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are man-
aging the corporation according to the law under which it exists." In-
deed, that the Roman Catholic Church runs the hospital was "wholly
immaterial," 258 concluded the Court.
Perhaps the best depiction of the theory of the horizontal separation of
higher powers comes not from the court of constitutional law but rather
from the arena of constitutional politics. In 2001, newly-installed Presi-
dent George W. Bush issued an executive order creating the White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. 259 The purpose
of the Office was to enlist the help of religious and community organiza-
tions in meeting the needs of underprivileged and underserved communi-
ties.260 Just as government agencies have the capacity to deliver social
services related to decreasing crime, fighting and treating drug addiction,
supporting families, building communities, and reducing poverty, so do
religious organizations. "Government cannot be replaced by such organi-
zations," acknowledged the executive order, "but it can and should wel-
come them as partners."'261 The executive order continued, echoing the
themes of independence and equality that we associate with the horizon-
tal separation of powers: religious organizations "should have the fullest
opportunity permitted by law to compete on a level playing field" 262 with
public secular institutions.
Later in 2002, President Bush issued a complementary executive order
on faith-based initiatives. 263 This one directed federal agencies to ensure
that religious organizations "are able to compete on an equal footing for
Federal financial assistance used to support social service programs. 264
Recognizing that religious institutions could face discrimination in the
process of applying for federal funding, the executive order commanded
that all applicants should be protected from discrimination on the basis of
religion or religious belief.265 As the prior order had done in creating the
Office in the first place, the executive order again paid special attention
to the themes underpinning the horizontal separation of powers: equality
and independence. In instructing federal agencies to treat religious orga-
257. Id. at 298.
258. Id.
259. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2001), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 21 at 597
(2006).
260. Id.
261. Id. § 1.
262. Id.
263. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2002), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 601 at 754-56
(2006).
264. Id. § 2(b).
265. Id. § 2(c).
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nizations equitably, the executive order further charged that religious or-
ganizations should be eligible to apply for and receive federal funding to
deliver social services "without impairing their independence, autonomy,
expression, or religious character. '266 To further stress the independence
and equality of religion as an equal partner in the project of delivering
social services, the executive order stressed that religious organizations
could continue to operate as they normally do within their fully private
sphere of autonomy:
Among other things, faith-based organizations that receive Federal
financial assistance may use their facilities to provide social services
supported with Federal financial assistance, without removing or al-
tering religious art, icons, scriptures, or other symbols from these fa-
cilities. In addition, a faith-based organization that applies for or
participates in a social service program supported with Federal finan-
cial assistance may retain religious terms in its organization's name,
select its board members on a religious basis, and include religious
references in its organization's mission statements and other charter-
ing or governing documents.267
Though President Barack Obama has since renamed the Office as the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, 268
the Office continues to seek ways to involve religious organizations in the
work of delivering social services to America's communities. What is
most important for our purposes, though, is to recognize the parallel be-
tween the horizontal separation of powers and the relationship between
Church and State exhibited in the mission of the Office. By assigning
public functions to religious organizations, the Office recognizes that re-
ligion and government are coequal entities. It moreover exemplifies the
positive requirement that attends to the horizontal separation of powers:
Church and State possess intersecting competencies, and it is conse-
quently the duty of government to yield to religion some of its claim to
social management and development where religion is competent to dis-
charge an otherwise public task. And in the course of executing the pub-
lic task, religion must not suppress its religiosity. Quite the contrary, the
pillars of equality and independence protect the individuality and indige-
nous character of religion. Religion may therefore perform its important
social services proudly as a religious institution; regarding government
and religion as equal sovereigns rejects the inhibition coercing a religious
organization receiving government funding to operate under the cover of
a nonreligious calling.
The Supreme Court has often relied on similar reasoning to authorize
religious organizations to discharge public functions. Education is per-
haps the most conspicuous context in which we may perceive the Court's
266. Id. § 2(f).
267. Id.
268. Exec. Order No. 13,498, 3 C.F.R. 219 (2009), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. at 64 (Supp. 111
2010).
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permissive posture toward religion as a deliverer of important social ser-
vices. One case is particularly instructive. In Zorach v. Clauson, New
York City parents whose children attended public schools challenged the
constitutionality of a "released time" program under which public school
students could be excused from school property at the request of their
parents to attend religious instruction or to participate in devotional exer-
cises during part of the school day.269 The Court upheld the program,
finding it wholly in conformity with the standard set by the Establishment
Clause because the program "involve[d] neither religious instruction in
public school classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds. '270 More
interesting than the result, though, was the Court's reasoning. The Court
called upon the themes of independence and mutual respect that re-
present the basis of separation of powers theory in discussing the separa-
tion of Church and State: "When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. '271 The Court
continued, refining the point to highlight the special place of religion in
American life:
To hold that [the state] may not [respect religion] would be to find in
the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe .... [W]e find no
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government
to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to
widen the effective scope of religious influence. 272
According to the Zorach Court, the fabric of the American legal tradition
therefore requires the state to respect religion as an authoritative, con-
structive, and legitimacy-conferring institution entitled to regard equal to
that afforded to the state in the delivery of social services.
Acknowledging that religious organizations perform a valuable social
benefit when they help relieve the pressures of oversubscription on the
public school system, the Court has moreover praised religious organiza-
tions for discharging a valuable social service when they erect institutions
to instruct children. In Hunt v. McNair, the Court upheld state revenue
bonds to raise funds for a religious college wanting to take advantage of a
state law available to all schools-religious and otherwise-for projects
like campus construction.273 The Court cited the text of the South Caro-
269. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1952).
270. Id. at 309.
271. Id. at 313-14.
272. Id. at 314; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993)
("[W]e have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to
a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an at-
tenuated financial benefit.").
273. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1973).
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lina law with approval to make the point that religious organizations
render a useful public service in delivering important social services: the
law was "all to the public benefit and good" because "the purpose of [the
law is] to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to
enable [secular and religious] institutions for higher education in the
State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely needed
.... ,274 This was also the case in Board of Education v. Allen, a contro-
versial case in which New York had passed a law authorizing textbook
loans to all middle and high school students, including students attending
parochial schools.275 In holding that the program complied with the re-
quirements of the Establishment Clause, the Court noted that religious
organizations were capable of competently performing the secular task of
educating children: "[T]he continued willingness to rely on private school
systems, including parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide seg-
ment of informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those
schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education to their stu-
dents. ' '276 The Court further noted that "parochial schools are perform-
ing, in addition to their sectarian function, the task of secular
education. ' 277 Constitutionally permissible tax benefits have also been
issued to parochial schools under a statute authorizing deductions to both
public and private schools for expenses arising out of educational expend-
itures. 278 This has also been the case where the state gave vocational re-
habilitation assistance to a blind student receiving religious instruction to
become a pastor, missionary, or youth director.279
Even when the Court has invalidated school-related programs for
breaching the boundary separating Church from State, it has done so in
the interest of protecting the independence of each realm.2 80 In Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, for instance, where the Court
ruled unconstitutional a program permitting religious groups to instruct
students in public school buildings "through the use of the State's com-
pulsory public school machinery, '281 the Court was most interested in
protecting the autonomous rule of both Church and State: "The First
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere. '282 Similarly, when the Court disallowed a
New York state statute authorizing reimbursements to parochial schools
274. Id. at 742 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-41 (Supp. 1971)).
275. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
276. Id. at 247-48.
277, Id. at 248.
278. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
279. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 481 (1986).
280. Indeed, the choice to selectively exclude religious organizations from the universe
of successful government grant recipients may actually reinforce the autonomy principle
that anchors the right to free religious exercise. See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1271-72 (2008).
281. I11. ex. rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
282. Id.
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for the cost of recordkeeping and testing programs required under state
law, the reasoning was the familiar point of institutional independence.283
To require periodic audits of religious schools-the kind of audits that
demand meticulous and probing inquiries into the practices of religious
institutions-is to breach the buffer that protects religion from govern-
ment.284 In order to satisfy both the constraints of the Establishment
Clause and the requirements of the New York state statute, government
cannot be allowed to gainsay the teachings of religious institutions, and
those religious institutions cannot use public moneys to test religious
materials. Yet, under the statute, "[i]n order to prove their claims for
reimbursement, sectarian schools would be placed in the position of try-
ing to disprove any religious content in various classroom materials. ' 285
As for the state, it "would have to undertake a search for religious mean-
ing in every classroom examination offered in support of a claim. 286
That would prove problematic in two respects. First, it would cast the
Court "in the role of arbiter of [an] essentially religious dispute," 287 a
state of affairs that is inconsistent with religious and governmental inde-
pendence. Second, the very prospect of a judicial dispute "about what
does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment, '288 which is re-
pugnant to the interest of institutional independence that courts seek to
vindicate when applying the Establishment Clause.
Likewise, when the Court prohibited New York from instituting a daily
prayer in its public schools,289 it took an effusively praiseworthy posture
toward religion. Referencing the history of the Establishment Clause-
which, according to the Court, had been designed "out of an awareness
that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to make them
speak only the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak
and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray
to" 29 0-the Court gestured toward the role of the State in protecting re-
ligion from the intrusive reach of government, precisely so that Church
may be allowed to play its central role in American life. "The [Clause]
thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of
our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to per-
mit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." 291 For the Court,
what follows from the religion-regarding purpose of the Establishment
Clause is that "it is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious" to order gov-
ernment to stay away from "the business of writing or sanctioning official
283. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 126 (1977).
284. Id. at 132.
285. Id. at 132-33.
286. Id. at 133.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
290. Id. at 435.
291. Id. at 431-32.
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prayers. '2 92 Quite the contrary, it is to afford religion its due respect and
deference. The same is true of Levitt v. Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty, where the Court did not allow public reimburse-
ments to parochial schools for state-mandated testing and recordkeep-
ing.2 9 3 The Court's concern was not that parochial school teachers would
act in bad faith to circumvent the limitations of the Establishment Clause
but rather that the mere existence of the risk that Church and State could
become fused, instead of separate, powers was enough to induce the
Court to enforce the wall that divides the independent realm of religion
from that of government.294
Only by recognizing the independence and independent social value of
religion may the Court adopt such a view of the Establishment Clause.
Without seeing religion as independent from government and as an inde-
pendently legitimating institution, it is not possible to justify the state of
affairs that governs Church-State relations, which is a regime anchored in
"an affirmative policy that considers [religious organizations] as benefi-
cial and stabilizing influences in community life" 295 and which regards
these groups as "useful, desirable, and in the public interest. '296 Such
affirmative policies include tax exemptions like the one at issue in Walz v.
Tax Commission of N.Y., where the dispute concerned whether religious
organizations could be excepted from property taxes in light of their char-
itable status.297 The Court approved the exemption on the theory that
granting religion this socially useful independence from government "re-
stricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to com-
plement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the
other. '298 Once again, therefore, we can perceive the Court's interest in
protecting the independence of both religion and government.
To position Church and State as institutional equals requires a robust
protection for free religious exercise. For without strong armor around
the freedom of religion, religion cannot operate freely and independently
of external pressures that would otherwise inhibit its practice and obser-
vance. The Court has recognized this vital interconnection between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, many times articulat-
292. Id. at 435; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000)
(prohibiting public school district's policy permitting student-led and -initiated prayer at
football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584-86 (1992) (disallowing clergy from
offering prayers in official public school ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61
(1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools
for meditation or prayer).
293. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973).
294. Id. at 480; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (holding unlawful
an Ohio law granting direct aid to sectarian schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366
(1975) (invalidating a Pennsylvania program providing direct aid to parochial schools);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973) (ruling unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law di-
rectly reimbursing parents for children's parochial school tuition).
295. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 666-67.
298. Id. at 676.
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ing a forceful defense of free religious exercise in terms that resound in
the separation of powers themes of equality and independence.2 99 In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court spoke to the reason that the Constitu-
tion bars Congress and the states from making laws establishing a religion
or impinging upon the right to free religious exercise: "On the one hand,
it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the prac-
tice of any form of worship," wrote the Court, adding that "[o]n the other
hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. ' '3°° In
settling the dispute in the case-whether a group of Jehovah's Witnesses
could constitutionally be prosecuted under a statute that forbade individ-
uals from soliciting without a license on behalf of religious causes from
persons who are not adherents of that religious cause-the Cantwell
Court concluded that the statute offended our sense of religious dignity
and personhood, both of which are expressed when we manifest our relig-
ious beliefs: "The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under
their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary
than in our own country for a people composed of many races and of
many creeds. '30 1 Therefore, continued the Court, it would be improper
to require a license from the state to share one's religious beliefs with
another:
[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious
views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exer-
cise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious
cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution. '30 2
What matters, then, is to guard zealously the independence of thought
and action when they derive from religion.
We have seen this most clearly in the Court's doctrine of the "preferred
position" of the freedom of religion. Although it is true that a state can-
not impose a tax for the privilege of exercising a right guaranteed under
the Constitution, the rights enshrined in the First Amendment are espe-
cially worthy of security against infringement: "It is one thing to impose a
tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to
exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. ' 30 3 The
reason, according to the Court, is that "freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position. '304 For example,
where either a publicly- or company-owned town seeks to curb the relig-
ious expression rights of citizens, the town faces a high burden to justify
the restriction: "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
299. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993); Walz, 397 U.S. at 672; Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221-23 (1963).
300. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
301. Id. at 310.
302. id. at 307.
303. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
304. Id. at 115.
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property against those of people to enjoy freedom of press and religion,
as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a
preferred position. '30 5 Not only must the infringing body find a way to
defend its violation of a constitutional right, but it must find a way to
validate its breach of a preferred constitutional right that sits at the base
of the meaning of democratic self-government: "As we have stated
before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amend-
ment 'lies at the foundation of free government by free men' and we must
in all cases 'weigh the circumstances' and appraise . . . the reasons ... in
support of the regulation of (those) rights. '30 6 Under the horizontal sep-
aration of higher powers, Church therefore enjoys both exemptions and
immunities that lay bare its coequal and independent standing alongside
State.
The wide berth granted to religion as an institution worthy of deference
under the theory of horizontally separated powers is similarly evident
elsewhere in the Court's jurisprudence. Consider the controversy over
legislative prayer. When a member of the Nebraska legislature chal-
lenged the constitutionality of opening each legislative session with a
state-funded chaplain's prayer, the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim,
holding the legislative prayer constitutional.30 7 For a public body to in-
vite within its chamber the performance of a religious ritual appears upon
first glance and deeper reflection to pose the very kind of fusion between
Church and State that the Establishment Clause is intended to thwart.
The Court's judgment to the contrary is accordingly quite surprising,
mostly because the decision turns on the historical standing of the relig-
ious ritual of legislative prayer dating back to the First Congress.30 8 That
the First Congress voted both to approve the First Amendment for ratifi-
cation by the states and that in the same week it also voted to appoint a
paid chaplain for each chamber suggested to the Court that Congress cer-
tainly did not intend the Establishment Clause to forbid the actions it had
itself just taken.30 9 The Court therefore concluded that "[t]his unique his-
tory leads us to accept the interpretation of the First Amendment drafts-
men who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a
practice of prayer similar to that now challenged. ' 310 But the Court ac-
knowledged that there is more to this than simply historical practice. Be-
ginning "legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of
our society," 311 wrote the Court, adding that for a public body to invoke
religious guidance was not to establish a religion, but more accurately to
acknowledge that America is a country of religious people whose civil
305. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
306. Id. (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)); see also Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (invalidating ordinance restricting distribution
or sale of religious materials without first obtaining written permission from municipality).
307. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-86 (1983).
308. Id. at 791-92.
309. Id. at 790.
310. Id. at 791.
311. Id. at 792.
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institutions are founded on strong religious beliefs.312
We have seen this deferential posture toward religion arise time and
again in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court has
even adopted a term for the constitutional indulgence granted to religion
on the strength of its historical significance in the American tradition:
ceremonial deism, a phrase adopted from the work of Eugene Rostow. 313
The concept of ceremonial deism refers to "brief official acknowledge-
ments of religion . . . [ranging] from the national motto, to the words
'under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance, to the cities of Corpus Christi
and St. Louis, to the phrase 'in the Year of our Lord,' or the abbreviation
A.D. on public documents. '314 In the Court's case law, these official
acknowledgements have generally been interpreted as constitutionally
sound because they are not commonly viewed, according to the Court, as
either indicating or implying governmental sanction of the religious be-
liefs they espouse or represent. 315 It is hard, however, to distinguish cere-
monial deism from what the Court has otherwise ruled unconstitutional:
"A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to ad-
vance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden
'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has
advanced religion through its own activities and influence." 316 Yet in re-
fusing to invalidate instances of ceremonial deism apart from legislative
prayer-including a recitation, 317 an emblem, 318 a Sunday closing law,319
and a government program320 -it appears that the Court is permitting
government itself to advance religion, or at the very least making it possi-
ble for government to advance religion. The reason the Court has con-
structed the concept of ceremonial deism can only be because the Court
hopes to recognize the centrality of religion in the lives of Americans
while also sustaining a strong perception, though perhaps not necessarily
the reality, of Church standing separate from State.
312. Id.
313. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314. B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and
Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 711 (2010).
315. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 n.46 (1989).
316. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (emphasis in original).
317. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2004) (dismissing chal-
lenge to daily recitation of Pledge of Allegiance for lack of standing).
318. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 691-92 (2005) (approving display on public
property of Ten Commandments and other symbols of faith and statehood). But see Mc-
Creary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51, 868-70 (2005) (invalidating display of Ten
Commandments where purpose could not be classified as secular or even as benignly relig-
ious); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-45 (1980) (per curiam) (disallowing state statute
requiring posting copy of Ten Commandments in each public schoolroom).
319. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 452 (1961) (finding that Sabbath laws
did not violate the Establishment Clause).
320. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 595-96 (2007) (finding
petitioners lacked standing to challenge expenditures in connection with the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives).
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C. CHURCH UNDER STATE
While the Court has most often adopted a theory of horizontally sepa-
rated powers to resolve establishment disputes, it has also on occasion
applied the vertical separation of powers. The vertical separation of pow-
ers creates a hierarchy of constitutional authority pursuant to which ei-
ther God or man is hoisted above the other and the superior may exert
preemptive control over its subordinate. Much like the vertically sepa-
rated powers in American federalism contemplate the national govern-
ment trumping its state equivalents in the event of a constitutional, legal,
or regulatory conflict, the vertical separation of Church and State envis-
ages Church or State overriding the other when the commands of the
former conflict with those of the latter. The vertical separation of powers
between Church and State produces two possibilities: Church under State
and Church over State. The first of these two alternatives is more com-
mon in American constitutional law, and perhaps with reason. After all,
the liberal democratic interests of neutrality, fairness, and equality re-
quire religious practices to conform to the rule of law. Therefore, pursu-
ant to the separation of higher powers conception of Church under State,
government is situated above religion in the hierarchy of constitutional
authority and may exert comprehensive and preemptive control over it.
To draw an analogy from the vertical separation of powers, Church under
State implies an organizational structure where government is endowed
with the equivalent of a Supremacy Clause that compels religion to con-
form its conduct to it.321
Nowhere is the hierarchy situating government over religion more evi-
dent than the Court's earliest polygamy case. 322 In Reynolds v. United
States, a Utah resident pled not guilty to the charge of having more than
one wife in contravention of a congressional law prohibiting polygamy.323
The threshold issue in the case was not polygamy, but rather a number of
questions of criminal procedure, including whether a grand jury impan-
eled under the laws of Utah and consisting of fewer than the federally
prescribed number of panelists could properly issue an indictment under
a federal statute. 324 Yet in concluding that the indictment was proper, the
Court also addressed the matter of religious belief, specifically whether
the sincere belief that polygamy is a religious duty can constitute a valid
defense to breaking a law prohibiting it.325 The answer in the United
States, the Court announced, must be no. The reason was clear to the
Court:
[Als a law of the organization of society under the exclusive do-
minion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall
321. Cf U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (designating the Constitution and federal laws as
"supreme").
322. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
323. Id. at 146.
324. Id. at 153-54.
325. Id. at 154-62.
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not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary be-
cause of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. 326
To allow polygamous relations would be to elevate religion over gov-
ernment and therefore render the United States an ungovernable nation,
reasoned the Court. The statute was constitutional because it
"prescrib[ed] a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and
in places over which the United States have exclusive control. '327 What
is more, permitting polygamous relations would introduce an uneasy dis-
tinction in the laws of religious freedom because the inequitable result
would be to acquit those engaging in polygamous practices for religious
reasons and to convict those engaging in the same conduct for reasons
unrelated to religion. 328 It was therefore necessary, from the Court's per-
spective, to subordinate Church to State in this particular instance in the
larger interest of administrative fairness, uniform application, and social
order in the civil laws of the country.
The Court reached the same conclusion the following year in Davis v.
Beacon, once again elevating government over religion.329 A man whose
Mormon religion required the practice of polygamy was convicted for vi-
olating the criminal laws of Idaho, which barred Mormons from register-
ing to vote because of their conduct and advocacy of polygamy.330 The
question before the Court was whether Idaho could lawfully make it a
crime to divest the right to vote from persons convicted of crimes, namely
polygamy; the Court answered in the affirmative.331 The tension in the
case set in opposition the right to free religious belief, the fear of estab-
lishing a faith whose tenets foreclosed sufficient room for other faiths,
and the interest of uniformity in the application of the criminal laws of
the nation. For the Court, the tension could be resolved in one way
alone: by subordinating the free exercise of religion to the nation's crimi-
nal laws. "However free the exercise of religion may be," wrote the
Court, "it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed
with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the
subjects of punitive legislation. '332
Surely we can understand why the Court would take this view. Imag-
ine, as the Court itself asked in the course of reaching its judgment, a
person "'believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under
326. Id. at 166-67.
327. Id. at 166.
328. Id.
329. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890).
330. Id. at 337, 346-47.
331. Id. at 337, 348.
332. Id. at 342-43.
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which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?'1, 333 The answer
to the Court's rhetorical question is obvious, at least according to the
Court. There can be no exemption from the criminal laws of generally
applicability, especially where the religious practices for which the ex-
emption is requested visit such deleterious consequences on other per-
sons and in public spaces. How can a society, even the most liberal of
democracies, accommodate the religious practices of its members where
those practices are repugnant to the criminal laws that apply broadly and
equally to everyone? The Court raised that very question before quickly
dispensing with it, describing it as a matter that no civil society can take
seriously:
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been
seriously contended that the whole punitive power of the govern-
ment for acts, recognized by the general consent of the Christian
world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory legislation,
must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious sect encour-
aging crime may be carried out without hindrance.334
But relegating religion to the equivalent of state in the federal structure
of government need not necessarily mean that religion is not worth pro-
tecting. On this point, the Court made an important distinction between
action and belief.335 Under the Constitution, the latter is given the
fiercest protection and afforded something approximating immunity from
prosecution. But the former is squarely within the reach of the state, and
rightfully so, says the Court: "It was never intended or supposed that the
[First] Amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation
for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals
of society. '336 However, "[w]ith man's relations to his Maker and the
obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an ex-
pression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interfer-
ence can be permitted, ' 337 though the Court did add an important
qualification, stipulating that this freedom of thought applies only "pro-
vided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosper-
ity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with."'338 Therefore,
according to the Court, although the proper organization and manage-
ment of civil society may require that Church be situated under State, this
does not diminish the place of religion in the lives of the people and the
nation.339 This is a powerful illustration of the Court situating religion
prior to government, Church over State, and God above man.
Consigning religion to secondary status below government has sober
consequences for the free exercise of religion. When Church cedes to the
333. Id. at 344 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166).
334. Id. at 343.
335. Id. at 344.
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commands of State, the universe of actions that may be lawfully taken in
the name of religion must necessarily shrink. This is a reasonable result
from divesting religion of its special quality and from requiring religion to
conform its practices to those that constrain and compel what nonreli-
gious organizations may or may not do. Indeed, the focal point of this
typology of Church-State relations-Church under State-is the distinc-
tion between thought and action. The Court will defend the position that
no official action can lawfully restrict the scope and content of religious
belief, for it forms the core of the freedom of religion. However, the
same range of constitutional protection does not apply-nor can it apply
in a civil context where Church sits under State-to the way religious
beliefs are manifested as actions. For unlike religious beliefs, which are
private and have little effect on third parties, religiously motivated ac-
tions are not only visible to or felt by others but moreover exact public
reverberations across the community.
The Court has recognized as much. Whether religiously driven actions
have stemmed from religious rituals or whether they have derived from
applications for religious exemptions, the Court has often invoked con-
cerns about public safety and welfare, and alternatively the concept of
equal treatment, to subject religious organizations to the same standards
that govern secular organizations. For instance, one relevant case con-
cerned a city ordinance requiring a license and the payment of fees in
order to lawfully engage in selling books and pamphlets door-to-door.340
When two persons were arrested for traveling house-to-house without a
license, sharing their religious beliefs with others, playing recordings of
religious lectures, and distributing religious materials in return for a con-
tribution of twenty-five cents per book, they argued that the ordinance
violated their right to free religious exercise.341 The Court disagreed, de-
claring that religious organizations must follow the same rules as secular
ones when they engage in commercial activity. "When proponents of re-
ligious or social theories use the ordinary commercial methods of sales of
articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of
the power of the state to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of can-
vassing, '' 342 concluded the Court, making sure to emphasize that "[i]t is
prohibition and unjustifiable abridgement which [are] interdicted, not
taxation. ' 343 The Court also insisted that although the Constitution can-
not command belief, it can always regulate conduct:344
340. Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 586 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943)
(per curiam).
341. Id. at 588-89.
342. Id. at 597.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 594. But the Court has held that "[a] state may not impose a [tax] for the
[privilege of exercising] a right granted by the [Clonstitution." See Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1943) ("It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or




Courts, no more than Constitutions, can intrude into the consciences
of men or compel them to believe contrary to their faith or think
contrary to their convictions, but courts are competent to adjudge
the acts men do under color of a constitutional right, such as that of
freedom of speech or of the press or the free exercise of religion and
to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recog-
nized powers, equally precious to mankind. So the mind and spirit of
man remain forever free, while his actions rest subject to necessary
accommodation to the competing needs of his fellows. 345
Yet the distinction between religious belief and action is not always as
clear as we might hope. For instance, imagine a state statute granting
citizens the right to observe the Sabbath on their chosen day of the week,
therefore authorizing them to absent themselves from work or other
commitments when applicable. The action of observing the Sabbath, and
therefore excusing oneself from an employment commitment, is
prompted by the religious belief in the sanctity of the Sabbath. Would
upholding that statute grant an immunity to religious action or to relig-
ious thought? That was the clash in Estate of Thornton v. Calder, in
which Connecticut had passed such a statute. 346 The Court appears to
have taken the view that religious action, not religious belief, was the
issue, and therefore held that the law ran afoul of the Establishment
Clause.347 Here is how the Court explained it: "Under the Religion
Clauses, government must guard against activity that impinges on relig-
ious freedom, and must take pains not to compel people to act in the
name of any religion. '348 With this as the Court's point of departure, one
could have predicted the outcome because the dispute was characterized
as one involving action and not thought.
Consider another example: Is the religiously driven choice to refuse to
fulfill a state constitution's compulsory military service as a condition for
bar admission an illustration of religious belief or a manifestation of relig-
iously compelled behavior? The Supreme Court, in In re Summers,
adopted the former view, upholding the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
to deny a conscientious objector's petition for admission to practice
law.349 The conscientious objector had long espoused nonviolence, de-
clining to serve in either the military or police forces, contrary to the Illi-
nois Constitution's requirement that all men his age serve in the militia
during times of war.350 When the time came to apply for admission to the
Bar, he was not admitted on the theory that his refusal to comply with the
terms of the Illinois Constitution compromised irreparably his capacity
both to serve as an officer charged with the administration of justice and
345. Jones, 316 U.S. at 593-94.
346. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 704-06 (1985).
347. Id. at 710-11.
348. Id. at 708.
349. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 562, 573 (1945).
350. Id. at 571.
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to take an oath to support the Constitution. 351 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the conscientious objector lost again. The Court first observed
that:
Under our Constitutional system, men could not be excluded from
the practice of law, or indeed from following any other calling, sim-
ply because they belong to any of our religious groups, whether Prot-
estant, Catholic, Quaker or Jewish, assuming it conceivable that any
state of the Union would draw such a religious line."'352
But the majority then concluded that no such discriminatory purpose
had triggered the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court to deny him ad-
mission.353 Here again, we have an instance of the Court elevating State
above Church, almost to the point of divesting religion of its distinctive
quality. For when a person's religious beliefs-in this case the religiously
inspired belief in nonviolence-prompts the state to erect a barrier to his
entry into a profession, religion becomes an affiliation no different from
cultural and social affiliations generally deemed distasteful.
D. CHURCH OVER STATE
The Court has most often conceived of Church and State as institu-
tional equals, and less often as subordinate-superior. But it has also,
though only seldom, hoisted Church over State. In contrast to the con-
ception of Church under State, the conception of Church over State ele-
vates religion over government. On this view, religion may shape and
compel government action or inaction in the service of religious liberty
and freedom. This may manifest itself in religious accommodations or in
outright religious exemptions. But the key element of Church over State
is that religion may override government when the two come into con-
flict, with religion standing above government in the hierarchy of consti-
tutional authority.
Examples of the Court placing Church over State exist, but they re-
present the least common of the triumvirate of Church-State relation-
ships: Church and State, Church under State, and Church over State. The
theory behind the Court's disinclination to give religion precedence over
government derives from the moral design of liberal democracy. As
Charles Taylor reasons, "a liberal society should not be founded on any
particular notion of the good life" because "[t]hose who see their views
denied official favor would not be treated with equal respect in relation
to their compatriots espousing the established view. ' 354 To identify one
religion as more worthy of reverence than another, or to send the official
signal that religion itself is regarded more favorably than nonreligion,
would therefore violate a fundamental precept of liberal democracy.
Robert Audi takes the position that three principles must underpin all
351. Id. at 569-70.
352. Id. at 571.
353. Id.
354. CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 186 (1995).
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liberal democracies: liberty, equality, and neutrality.355 As to the first,
the state must tolerate the practice of any religion. The second precludes
the state from preferring one religion over another; but it is the third
principle, neutrality, which warns against positioning Church over State
insofar as it requires the state to neither favor nor disfavor religion and
the religious.356 The secularity of the state is thought to be the signature
feature of a liberal democracy, along with the constitutive requirements
of constitutional democracy. In a constitutional state anchored in the
principles of liberal democracy, the rule of law constrains the exercise of
power, individuals may seek redress for violations of their rights, and the
state must be secular and refrain from endorsing one religion over
another. 357
Yet the Court has at times upset the rules that give liberal democracy
its rationality, giving unusual deference to religion and, along the way,
further exacerbating the incoherence in which the Establishment Clause
is mired. In a nineteenth century case, the Court applied the vertical sep-
aration of powers between Church and State in a way that placed Church
above State. The dispute involved whether a church in the United States
seeking to hire a religious minister from a foreign country could be ex-
empted from a congressional law that prohibited any person or group
from "prepay[ing] the transportation, or in any way assist[ing] or en-
courag[ing] the importation or migration, of... any foreigner.., into the
United States ... to perform labor or service of any kind in the United
States, its territories, or the District of Columbia. '358 The Court ruled
that the church could indeed hire the foreign minister, and in doing so
effectively gave the church an exemption from a rule of general
application.35 9
What is most relevant for our purposes is not the Court's ruling itself
but more specifically the Court's reasoning. For that is where we per-
ceive why the Court chose to elevate Church above State. To begin with,
for the Court in this case, religion stands prior in importance to the state.
Without it, the community cannot function properly nor can it survive
precisely because religion is necessary to the United States. Here is the
Court's overture to readers, as it lays out one of the many facts that lead
it to its ultimate conclusion:
If we examine the constitutions of the various states, we find in them
a constant recognition of religious obligations. Every constitution of
every one of the forty-four states contains language which, either di-
rectly or by clear implication, recognizes a profound reverence for
religion, and an assumption that its influence in all human affairs is
355. ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTOFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE:
THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITCAL DEBATE 1, 3-4 (1997).
356. Id. at 4.
357. See Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy, 16 Wis. INr'L L.J. 61, 64 (1997).
358. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 457-58 (1892).
359. Id. at 458, 472.
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essential to the well-being of the community.36 °
As it began to elaborate its judgment, the Court took readers through a
religious history of the United States. Beginning with Christopher Co-
lumbus's discovery of the continent, 36 1 tracing the development of colo-
nies and the religious orientation they had given themselves, 362 through
the announcement of the Declaration of Independence, 363 followed by
the religious calling in state constitutions, 364 the United States Constitu-
tion,365 and in a previous judgment of the Supreme Court,366 the Court
concluded that, in its view, one thread ran through the entirety of the
American experience: religion. There was "no dissonance," wrote the
Court, in the historical facts of the United States: "There is a universal
language pervading them all, having one meaning. They affirm and reaf-
firm that this is a religious nation. '3 67 But the Court went a step even
further than that, calling America a Christian nation. Summarizing its
observation that America is a religious nation in words as clear as could
be, the Court declared that "[t]hese, and many other matters which might
be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic
utterances that this is a Christian nation. '368 America is not only a relig-
ious nation, it is a Christian one, according to Holy Trinity Church.
Two decades later, the Court once again elevated Church over State,
this time in a dispute concerning the appropriation of public funds for
Catholic-denomination instruction for Native Americans. 369 The case
arose against the backdrop of contested congressional appropriations to
pay a treaty debt owed by the United States to the Sioux Indian popula-
tion in connection with lands acquired in 1868.370 In exchange for the
land and territorial rights, the United States promised to provide a
schoolhouse and a teacher for every thirty elementary school students for
a period of twenty years. 371 Further exchanges of land and territorial
rights were made in 1877, and in 1889, Congress extended its treaty obli-
gations for another twenty-year period, pledging to make an annual ap-
propriation to fulfill the terms of its financial support for the Sioux
Indians. When Congress forbade, in its Indian appropriation acts for the
years 1895-1898, the use of public money for sectarian education, uncer-
tainty enveloped the status of the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions's
contract with the Secretary of the Interior to provide sectarian education
360. Id. at 468.
361. Id. at 465-66.
362. Id. at 466-67.
363. Id. at 467.
364. Id. at 468-70.
365. Id. at 470.
366. Id. at 471.
367. Id. at 470.
368. Id. at 471.
369. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 52-53 (1908).
370. Id. at 80-81.
371. Id. at 80.
2012]
SMU LAW REVIEW
to children of the Sioux Indians.372
May Congress appropriate public dollars to pay for Catholic denomina-
tional instruction? In this case, the answer was yes. But there were three
important qualifications: first, the appropriation was made for the benefit
of Sioux Indian children; second, the funds were owed on a debt; and
third, the Sioux Indians had specifically requested Catholic denomina-
tional instruction. According to the Court, "we cannot concede the pro-
position that Indians cannot be allowed to use their own money to
educate their children in the schools of their own choice because the gov-
ernment is necessarily undenominational, as it cannot make any law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. '373 On the Court's reasoning, although the United States is
bound by the Establishment Clause's prohibition against establishing a
religion-in this case, against awarding funding to schools exclusively for
their denominational character-that barrier collapses when the United
States spends public dollars on behalf of a third party in the context of a
prior obligation, namely a treaty.
The Court's judgment carries with it two important implications for the
neutrality of the United States on matters of religion. The first implica-
tion concerns the meaning of neutrality. If the Secretary of the Interior
can lawfully enter into a contract with a religious institution to provide
elementary education to Sioux Indian children, does there remain a prin-
cipled basis upon which to distinguish the Secretary of Education's choice
to contract with a religious institution to provide elementary education to
any population? The answer is very likely no, because otherwise the con-
cept of state neutrality would be transformed from its current rendering
of strict neutrality into something more closely resembling benevolent
neutrality. Under strict neutrality, religious institutions must fulfill secu-
lar criteria and champion a nonreligious purpose in order to permissibly
benefit from governmental action or inaction.374 In contrast, benevolent
neutrality holds that government action or inaction may permissibly ben-
efit religion provided all religions are benefited in an equal and equitable
fashion with no resulting preference given to one religion over an-
other.375 The Secretary's choice to fund Catholic denominational instruc-
tion would not only violate the rule of strict neutrality, but it would
necessarily precipitate the funding of other religious instruction if govern-
ment wanted to remain neutral, at least in the benevolent sense.
We can also perceive an important implication for the relative standing
of Church and State. One could plausibly interpret this case as situating
Church and State as institutional equals. Much like the matter of provid-
372. Id. at 54, 77.
373. Id. at 81-82.
374. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1961).
375. See DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE
COURSE OF AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS 48-49 (1991).
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ing medical care in Bradfield v. Roberts,376 where the Court sanctioned
congressional disbursements to a hospital operated under the auspices of
the Roman Catholic Church, providing educational instruction is likewise
a secular activity. Both government and religion can perform the task of
instructing children. Granted, the content of the instruction can of course
change the complexion of the instruction from secular to sectarian, but
the act of classroom teaching itself is a neutral exercise.
Nevertheless, Quick Bear is best interpreted as an instance of Church
over State. The Court compelled the United States to answer first to its
commitment to fund Catholic denominational instruction to the Sioux In-
dians and only second to the Constitution, which would proscribe public
funding for Catholic denominational instruction where, as in the case,
that instruction was chosen specifically for its Catholic character.377 By
requiring the Secretary to act in a way that undermined the American
commitment to the nonestablishment norm, the Court signaled that relig-
ion belongs in a category separate and apart from other nonpublic institu-
tions.378 This ruling illustrates the Court's view that religion may
sometimes demand special dispensations that compromise or even dis-
place fundamental American constitutional commitments to neutrality in
the interest of larger objectives, in this case the fulfillment of an outstand-
ing national obligation.
E. CHURCH OR STATE?
The battery of tests through which the Court has run the Establishment
Clause should have by now resulted in some measure of clarity on the
border separating Church from State. But today the border appears as
blurry as ever before. With the Court ruling in ways that sometimes lo-
cate Church and State as institutional equals, other times in ways that
relegate Church under State, or still other times in ways that elevate
Church over State, the deep incoherence of the Establishment Clause
only risks getting deeper. Therein lies the source of the great confusion
that has enveloped the Court's establishment case law: the Court has
failed to consistently deploy either a doctrinal anchor or an organizing
framework to reliably resolve disputes pitting religion versus government.
We have observed for ourselves why scholars so vigorously decry the
Court's Establishment Clause case law. When the Court rules that a state
cannot reimburse, 379 or give a tax deduction,380 to parents for their chil-
dren's attendance at religious schools, yet a state can permit parents to
deduct from their income expenditures incurred for their children's text-
book and transportation expenses to religious schools, 381 it is right to
376. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
377. Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 81-82.
378. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of
the Nonestablishment Principles, 27 ARIZ. ST. LT 1085, 1089 (1995).
379. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973).
380. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790 (1973).
381. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1983).
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question the basis for the Court's distinctions. It is also reasonable to ask
why the Court has both approved 382 and disapproved 383 programs for
public school students to receive religious instruction from private teach-
ers. Observers should likewise wonder how it is possible for the Court
both to permit 384 and forbid 385 the use of federal moneys to fund reme-
dial classes taught by public school teachers and social workers in paro-
chial schools.
The apparent inconsistencies do not end there. It is unlawful, according
to the Court, to grant a sales tax exemption to religious periodicals,386 but
it is not to afford a property tax exemption to religious properties.387 It is
also sometimes unlawful for a state to give educational materials to relig-
ious schools 388 but it is sometimes constitutionally permissible for a state
to do the same thing.389 A state may also, consistent with the Constitu-
tion, require public schools to loan educational materials to religious
schools;390 but sometimes a state cannot do that because doing so would
be unconstitutional. 391 These are only some of the many divergences one
can perceive in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. And we
may trace their origin to the Court's three competing approaches to relig-
ion and government: Church and State as institutional equals, Church
under State, and Church over State.
Each of the three competing theoretical approaches can claim norma-
tive virtue in its ordering of the secular and the sacred, and each could
plausibly stand on its own as the operational blueprint for applying the
separation of powers to the separation of Church and State. But when
they are deployed concurrently, these three incongruent theories of
Church and State visit devastating consequences on the prospect of elab-
orating a coherent line of establishment case law. Constitutional clarity
suffers, perhaps irremediably, as do judicial predictability and confidence
in the administration of the law. If we wish to bring clarity to the Estab-
lishment Clause, the solution is two-fold. First, we must recognize that
establishment case law reflects the analytical structure of the separation
of powers. This Article begins the important work of demonstrating the
jurisprudential continuity between the separation of Church and State
and the separation of powers. Second, the Court, armed with the realiza-
tion that separation theory informs its establishment case law, must help
us reach clarity and consensus about whether God and man occupy com-
382. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 307 (1952).
383. Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1948).
384. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1997).
385. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-05 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at
208-09.
386. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (plurality opinion).
387. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970).
388. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
389. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801, 808 (2000).
390. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
391. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 353 (1975), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808.
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peting or complementary spheres of influence. The question remains,
though, how precisely should the Court pursue this worthy objective?
The Court need not, nor should it, take upon itself the task of articulat-
ing the grand organizing logic of American constitutional government as
it relates to religion and the public space. That may not be well received
in some corners where the Court is already seen as overstepping its con-
stitutional limits. 392 The Court can instead achieve the same result by
choosing, in the course of adjudicating a future establishment case and in
keeping with its function as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional mean-
ing, to map onto the separation of Church and State either a vertical or
horizontal theory of separated powers. The key is then to remain consis-
tent in applying that theory to disputes arising under the Establishment
Clause. In the course of issuing judgments that adhere reliably to a the-
ory of either vertically or horizontally separated powers, the Court would
make clear whether Church and State are institutional equals under
American constitutional law, or whether the Church and State relation-
ship is superior-subordinate, subordinate-superior, or some other varia-
tion on one of those forms.
From a doctrinal perspective, it is less important which of the three
approaches the Court adopts than that it adopts a single Establishment
Clause doctrine and remains committed to it going forward. The result
will be positive for the Court's jurisprudence, for it will set the Court on
the course to finally bringing constitutional clarity to the Establishment
Clause. Only good can follow from constitutional clarity: predictability in
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause and, just
as importantly, predictability in the many more cases that begin and end
in the lower federal courts at the trial and appellate level. A coherent
interpretation of the Establishment Clause will moreover have positive
consequences in the design and administration of public policy. Knowing
how the Court interprets the Establishment Clause-and specifically how
it understands the relationship between religion and government-will
help guide political actors in crafting programs that are more likely to
find favor if challenged in a lawsuit.
But from a sociopolitical perspective, the choice of Church or State
matters immensely. Would American liberal democracy tolerate a re-
gime where Church stood over State? The answer is presumably, and
rightly, no. After all, if the basis of the new American republic was to
free the colonies and their citizens from the grip of imperial overlords
who had imposed religious mandates upon them, then it is hard to con-
ceive of such a state affairs once again governing this land. That said,
there are liberal democratic ways in which one could envision construct-
ing a hierarchical relationship between religion and government in which
392. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONAILSM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 227-28, 246-48 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1358 (2006).
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Church rises above State. Indeed, as long as an establishmentarian na-
tion guarantees in theory and preserves in practice the full range of relig-
ious freedom for nonadherents, the concept of Church over State could
conform to the standards of liberal democracy. Several liberal demo-
cratic Western states have adopted this model, most notably including the
United Kingdom. Alternatively, perhaps the choice of Church under
State is just as problematic. There may be instances where government
should see religion as its equal, albeit an equal that operates in a separate
sphere, in order to grant religion and its adherents the respect and inde-
pendence they merit. All told, the choice of Church or State-Church
and State, Church under State, Church over State-is not an easy one to
make. But it is a necessary choice that faces both the Supreme Court and
its critics in their search for constitutional clarity.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the quest for constitutional clarity in establishment case law is
an elusive expedition. Can the Supreme Court really ever achieve the
jurisprudential coherence that scholars have called for? And even if the
Court could in fact finally develop a reliable, predictable, and consistent
framework to resolve establishment disputes, would that necessarily be a
desirable outcome? These two questions point to separate, though admit-
tedly interconnected, inquiries into what is at stake in the future of the
Establishment Clause. For now, it appears that the Court's establishment
case law is doomed to disrepair, given the decades of inconsistent inter-
pretation of the proper boundary separating Church from State. It is
quite literally impossible to discern a single principle or theory that
makes sense of the entire corpus of the Court's judgments under the Es-
tablishment Clause.
As I have sought to demonstrate, the reason for the Court's inconsis-
tent application of the Establishment Clause over the course of two cen-
turies is evident in the Court's establishment rulings themselves. And
that reason is chiefly that the Court has vacillated among different con-
ceptions of the relationship between religion and government. In some
instances, the Court has cast Church and State as institutional equals. In
others, it has elevated Church above State. And on still other occasions,
the Court has relegated Church below State. In the face of such variabil-
ity in the Court's decision rules, no constitutional principle stands a
chance of enjoying the consistent application that derives only from
equally consistent interpretation.
Nevertheless, choosing how to order religion and government may not
be a choice worth making. Whatever the direction in which the Court
might elect to nudge establishment jurisprudence, there is bound to be
dissatisfaction and perhaps even anger from the losing constituencies.
The public and political reaction would be particularly acute were the
Court to concretize one of the three archetypes of constitutional hierar-
chy between Church and State. Perhaps that explains why the Court has
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recently taken a page from Alexander Bickel's passive virtues,393 invok-
ing the constitutional barrier of standing to avoid deciding constitutional
controversies arising under the Establishment Clause.394 We cannot yet
know for certain; the sample size is much too small to conclude that the
Court's turn to standing represents a new institutional approach to gov-
erning the enduring tensions and collaborations between religion and
government.
That said, this Article provides the Court with a roadmap for finally
bringing coherence to the Establishment Clause. The answer is to apply
separation of powers theory to the separation of Church and State. With
the analysis undertaken above, the Court is now in a position to perceive
that it has unknowingly deployed its several Establishment Clause tests to
the same end: to police the border separating Church and State in an
effort to vindicate the very same democratic values we seek to achieve by
separating governmental powers-personal liberty, institutional equality,
and departmental independence. But recognizing the pattern does not
solve the problem, for the Court must subsequently determine whether
the horizontal or vertical separation of powers serves best to govern the
interrelationships between religion and government. If constitutional
clarity is an objective the Court believes worthy of achieving, then the
separation of powers may double as a useful analytical framework upon
which the Court may rely to make real the prospect of coherence in its
Establishment Clause case law. For only with a consistent application of
either vertically or horizontally separated powers may we at last find
peace in the constitutional law of religion and government. But achieving
peace in the constitutional politics of religion and government may well
be another matter altogether.
393. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
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394. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011)
(dismissing, for lack a standing, challenge to tax credit program); Hein v. Freedom From
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